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I. INTRODUCTION
Hadley v. Baxendale,1 one of the most celebrated cases in contract
law,2 sets forth the default rule that unforeseeable consequential
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
ggeis@law.ua.edu. B.S., University of California at Berkeley, 1992; J.D., M.B.A., University of Chicago, 1998. I thank Barry E. Adler, Amitai Aviram, William S. Brewbaker,
Frank Cross, Alan Durham, Dan Filler, Bill Henning, Peter Oh, Eric Posner, Keith Sharfman, Robert Sitkoff, James Spindler, and Norman Stein for insightful comments on a
draft, and I thank Mark Brandon, Alfred L. Brophy, Pamela Bucy, Michael Conoway, Austan Goolsbee, Todd Henderson, Justin Levinson, Kenneth Rosen, and George Triantis for
enlightening conversations and encouragement on the subject. Thanks to Klaus Wertenbroch and Bernd Skiera for their willingness to share data from several marketing studies.
An earlier version of this Article was presented at a faculty colloquium at The University
of Alabama School of Law and at the 2004 annual meeting of the Midwestern Law and
Economics Association. I am grateful for comments received during these presentations
and for the support of Dean Kenneth C. Randall, my faculty colleagues, and the Law
School Foundation. Finally, thanks to David Stras for help in early conceptualization, to
Todd Hines for library assistance, to Erica Nicholson for administrative help, and to my
research assistants, Daniel Hauser, Emily McCarson, and JJ Thomas, for their hard work.
1. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
2. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 92 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed.,
2d ed. 1995) (“Hadley v. Baxendale is still, and presumably always will be, a fixed star in
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damages are unrecoverable.3 The case has come to represent an important limit to the general rule awarding full expectation damages
for breach.4 And over time, Hadley has taken on even greater significance as an archetype for contract default rules that efficiently expose asymmetric information.5
A sophisticated line of literature examines the Hadley rule from
an economic point of view,6 building theoretical models to determine
whether it is efficient.7 While many variables matter, one key con-

the jurisprudential firmament.”); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 734-35 (1992) (“Hadley
continues to be one of the most analyzed contract cases in law and economics literature.”);
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
608, 616 n.21 (1998) (“Perhaps the most famous case in all of contract law, Hadley has become the example that default rule theorists most often employ to illustrate their conceptual arguments.”).
3. See 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.14 (3d ed., Aspen
Publishers 2004); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 120 (4th ed., LexisNexis 2001); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 14.5 (5th ed.
2003).
4. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3; MURRAY, supra note 3; PERILLO, supra note 3.
5. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven
Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley
v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); Eric A. Posner, Contract Remedies: Foreseeability, Precaution, Causation and Mitigation, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
162, 163-69 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
6. The economic approach to contracts permeates modern literature. See ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 188-306 (4th ed., Pearson Addison Wesley
2004); 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 1-72, 78-222 (publishing
various articles on this subject); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1-.15
(6th ed. 2003); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 291-385
(2004); 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 174, 425, 436 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Of course, economic analysis is not the only way to understand
contract law, and other approaches yield valuable insights. Economic analysis of contract
law—along with the broader use of economics in the law—also receives its share of external criticisms. For an overview of these criticisms, see BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY
AND CONTEXT 210-13 (3d ed., Carolina Academic Press 2004); and Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419 (1998). For
representative critiques, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
(1993); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed
Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1197 (1997); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987); and Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779 (1994). This Article does not address these concerns. Instead, it takes the position that
economic analysis is one way to shape contract law and that empirical analysis remains
relevant even when a noneconomic approach to contract law is preferred.
7. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5 (establishing a model for contract penalty defaults based on consequential damages); Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5 (developing a
formal model of the Hadley rule); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 636-39 (1990) (analyzing Hadley when sellers enjoy market power); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2 (extending Johnston’s
analysis); Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1547 (1999) (refining the Hadley model further to reflect the uncertainty of incurring
consequential damages in breach).
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cern is the distribution of buyer valuations for contract performance.8
Economic theory suggests that if many buyers place a low value on
performance while few buyers place a high value on performance (see
Figure 1a)—and if a buyer’s valuation is private, unobservable information—then the Hadley rule may be preferable to a rule that
awards full expectation damages.9 Under these circumstances, a
Hadley default may force private information to be revealed in a way
that encourages efficient precautions against breach and minimizes
transaction costs from bargaining around the default.10 If the valuation distributions are reversed (Figure 1b), the Hadley rule may be
inefficient, and a full-damages default might be better.
FIGURE 1A

FIGURE 1B

POSITIVELY SKEWED DISTRIBUTION

NEGATIVELY SKEWED DISTRIBUTION

Eric Posner, as part of a broader challenge to the economic analysis of contract law, has recently called to question the merits of this
Hadley model.11 He makes two arguments. First, it is simply too difficult to gather data needed to test Hadley.12 For instance, Posner
8. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 108; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell,
Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1615, 1625 (1999) (“[I]t seems that the Hadley rule is clearly desirable for cases . . . in
which a minority of buyers has valuations of performance that are substantially higher
than the valuations of ordinary buyers.”).
9. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 108-18; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at
285-86.
10. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 108-11. A comprehensive analysis of the optimal default rule needs to consider additional variables, including transaction costs incurred by high-value and low-value buyers to contract around the default rule, efficiency
gains from tailored precautions, the probability of incurring consequential damages, and
several other factors. See id.; Adler, supra note 7, at 1551-53. An extended discussion of the
Hadley solutions is found infra Part II.B.
11. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success
or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003) (“[T]he economic approach does not explain the
current system of contract law, nor does it provide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming contract law.”).
12. Id. at 837-38.
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doubts that buyer valuations can ever be determined empirically.13
Second, it is too hard to sum the impact of multiple variables in the
model.14 Even if lawmakers can estimate buyer valuations, they may
find it impossible to pick an optimal default rule because other variables—such as the transaction costs of contracting around a default,
the efficiency gains from information revelation, and the probability
of incurring consequential damages in breach—need to be added into
the mix.15 In short, armchair economic theorizing is not a fruitful endeavor.
Posner’s critique echoes a broader cry for empirical analysis16
throughout legal scholarship.17 A wide range of academics, practitio13. Id.
14. Id. Using a choice-of-remedies example, Richard Craswell synthesizes Posner’s
claim as follows:
[W]e cannot decide which remedy is “best” in any overall sense . . . unless we
have some way of measuring the relevant effects, both good and bad, and then
summing them to come up with a combined score for each of the possible remedies. But if we lack empirical data to measure the magnitudes of the various effects, any such sum will be difficult—or even impossible—to construct, so we
will never know which remedy is truly the most efficient.
Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of
Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 908 (2003).
15. Posner, supra note 11, at 836-39.
16. It is important to distinguish between quantitative empirical analysis and qualitative empirical analysis. Broadly speaking, empirical research uses evidence about the
world based on observation or experience. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). In the legal literature, the term “empirical analysis” often refers more narrowly to quantitative data and statistical techniques. Id. But empirical
analysis can also be qualitative (nonnumerical). Id. Many legal studies, of course, draw
upon qualitative worldly observations to support a hypothesis or contention and can thus
be considered empirical in nature. Id. at 2-3. In this sense, legal scholarship is often empirical. But consistent with other legal literature, all references to empirical analysis in
this Article, unless specified otherwise, refer to quantitative empirical analysis.
17. The Winter 2002 edition of The University of Chicago Law Review, for example,
explicitly raised the topic of empirical research in the law. Exchange, Empirical Research
and the Goals of Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). The provocative exchange
debated whether the current state of empirical legal scholarship was deeply flawed and
whether it even comported with the rules of inference that guide empirical research in the
social and natural sciences. Id. A subtheme of the exchange was a greater need for rigorous
empirical analysis in the law. See Epstein & King, supra note 16, at 1 (“[Law professors]
appear to have been proceeding with little awareness of, much less compliance with, many
of the rules of inference, and without paying heed to the key lessons of the revolution in
empirical analysis that has been taking place over the last century in other disciplines.”);
Frank Cross et al., Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
135, 135 (2002) (opining that Epstein and King “miss the targets they seek” as “their assault on legal scholarship violates many of their own rules of inference”); Jack Goldsmith
& Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,
153-54 (2002) (“Epstein and King overlook that legal scholarship frequently pursues doctrinal, interpretive, and normative purposes . . . . [G]iven constraints on time, information,
expertise, and research funds, academics face inevitable tradeoffs between rigor and accuracy, on the one hand, and timeliness, relevance, and utility, on the other.”); Richard L.
Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169, 171 (2002) (“[I]n
their haste to show that legal academics have failed, Epstein and King miss an important
opportunity to explore the ways in which [legal scholarship and the social sciences] can
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ners, and judges believe that contract law—along with other legal
disciplines—needs greater empirical analysis to test and support
scholarly claims.18 The shortage of quantitative empirical scholarship
in the law is attributed to many factors: lack of training among professors, lower prestige for empirical work, greater expense burdens,
and a longer research process incompatible with the law’s need for
timely insights.19 For whatever reasons, empirical analysis of concontribute to [each] other.”). Around this same time, the University of Illinois Law Review
sponsored a symposium on empirical legal research, focusing less on the quality of historical scholarship and more on the potential of future scholarship. Symposium, Empirical and
Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791.
18. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 210-11 (1995); Derek C. Bok, A
Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 581-82 (1983); Epstein & King, supra note 16, at 4-6; Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26
PEPP. L. REV. 807, 834 (1999) (“Our legal literature would be enriched if more academics,
particularly law professors, became more engaged in empirical legal research and produced
more of it.”); William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law & Economics, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 167, 168-70 (2003) (inferring from data analysis of three journals—The Journal of
Law and Economics, The Journal of Legal Studies, and the American Law and Economics
Review—that empirical articles appear more frequently in economic journals than in law
journals); Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 1, 2-4. The call for more empirical research comes from all ends of the legal realm.
See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 134 (2003) (calling for more empirical data to determine
whether NAFTA will chill efficient environmental regulation); Joseph A. Guzinski, Government’s Emerging Role as a Source of Empirical Information in Bankruptcy Cases, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 1998, at 8 (arguing that a lack of empirical information has hindered
efforts to reform the bankruptcy code); Michael Korybut, Searching for Commercial Reasonableness Under the Revised Article 9, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1383, 1405-06, 1457 (2002) (calling for empirical data to understand the treatment of commercial unreasonableness in
foreclosure under the revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code); Michael A.
Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal
Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 397 (1998) (raising a need for more empirical analysis
in tax scholarship); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A
Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1489 (1997) (raising
a need for greater quantitative empirical work in the context of guideline sentence appeals).
19. See Heise, supra note 18, at 815-24 (arguing that professors’ lack of formal, nonlegal graduate education, lack of resources, high risk, lack of prestige, and lack of internal
and external institutional incentives are to blame); Landes, supra note 18, at 178-80 (analyzing the effect and, at times, interplay of training, prestige, cost, and time); Julius G.
Getman, Contributions of Empirical Data to Legal Research, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 489, 493
(1985) (explaining why intellectual prestige, funding, and time, among other things, are
factors); Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 164-65 (arguing that, in addition to
other factors, the need for legal scholarship to provide timely guidance to the courts requires information to be occasionally offered under “conditions of empirical uncertainty”);
Epstein & King, supra note 16, at 9-10 (identifying the lack of training as one source of the
problem). But see Epstein & King, supra note 16, at 118 (“[Legal scholars] can conduct
first-rate [empirical] research that they can create and disseminate rapidly.”). Recent literature focuses on mitigating these shortcomings by building the institutional infrastructure needed to support empirical research in the law. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, Building an Infrastructure for Empirical Research in the Law, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (2003);
Howell E. Jackson, Analytical Methods for Lawyers, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321 (2003); Matthew Spitzer, Evaluating Valuing Empiricism (at Law Schools), 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 328
(2003); David E. Van Zandt, Discipline-Based Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332 (2003). It
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tract law is in its infancy.20 And few have studied the Hadley rule
empirically.21
This Article takes up the task of empirically assessing Hadley in
three simple markets. Drawing upon willingness-to-pay research in
the field of marketing, this Article first estimates the distribution of
buyer valuations for a can of Coca-Cola, a piece of pound cake, and
an ergonomic pen.22 Monte Carlo simulation, a technique developed
by Manhattan Project scientists, is then used to model complex interactions between multiple variables and the overall impact of alternative default rules on social welfare.23 Ultimately, this combinashould be noted, however, that the number of empirical legal articles may be on the rise. A
search for the term empirical in the title of all American law reviews published between
1990 and 2000 revealed 231 results. Epstein & King, supra note 16, at 15-16 & 16 n.37. An
updated search for all such articles published from 2001 to 2004 yields 216 results. This
search was conducted in Westlaw’s Journals and Law Reviews (JLR) database on March 9,
2005, for the term empirical in the title field.
20. Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1033, 1036. A recent review of empirical contracts scholarship in
over 500 law journals from 1985 to 2000 yields just twenty-seven articles. Id. at 1036-37 &
app. By comparison, a search in just fifteen top law journals during the years 1980-2001
uncovers seventy-one economics-oriented articles and fifty-two noneconomics-oriented articles on contracts. Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of Two Decades of Contract Law
Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 57 SMU L. REV. 105, 107 (2004)
(analyzing the incidences of judicial citations of economic, noneconomic, and empirical contract scholarship). Several commentators bemoan the low level of empirical contracts research. E.g., Korobkin, supra, at 1037 (“[T]he empirical study of contract law is a very underdeveloped genre of legal scholarship.”); Weintraub, supra note 18, at 4 (“Despite this
need for data, however, to date there have been only a handful of empirical studies focusing on particular contract problems and relationships . . . .”). More broadly, a recent study
estimates that just 20.9% of all articles on common law subjects (mainly contracts, torts,
and property) published in The Journal of Legal Studies from 1972 to 2002 were empirical.
Landes, supra note 18, at 170 & tbl.1. By comparison, during this same time period, 55% of
articles on crime, 52.3% of articles on procedure, and 50% of articles on public choice in the
journal were empirical. Id. Landes also shows that empirical analysis enjoys an even
greater use among economists outside the legal academy. For instance, 72.4% of all articles
published in The Journal of Law and Economics (a publication largely edited by business
professors and largely focused on scholarship outside the legal academy) during the same
thirty-year period were empirical in nature. Id. at 168-70 & 170 tbl.1.
21. For existing empirical work on the Hadley doctrine, see Richard Danzig, Hadley v.
Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989); Johnston, supra note 7, at 639-48; and Janet T. Landa, Hadley
v. Baxendale and the Expansion of the Middleman Economy, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 455 (1987).
22. The buyer valuation estimations for these products are developed from marketing research by Klaus Wertenbroch and Bernd Skiera in Measuring Consumers’ Willingness to Pay at
the Point of Purchase, 39 J. MARKETING RES. 228 (2002). For additional research on the willingness-to-pay methodology, see Gerald E. Smith & Thomas T. Nagle, How Much Are Customers Willing to Pay?, MARKETING RES., Winter 2002, at 20; and HENRIK SATTLER & FRANZISKA VÖLCKNER,
METHODS FOR MEASURING CONSUMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY (Inst. of Mktg., Retailing & Mgmt.
Sci. at the Univ. of Hamburg, Research Papers on Marketing and Retailing No. 009, 2002), available at http://www.henriksattler.de/publikationen/HS_FV_WillingnesstoPay.pdf.
23. On the links between Monte Carlo simulation and the Manhattan Project, see
Roger Eckhardt, Stan Ulam, John Von Neuman, and the Monte Carlo Method, 15 LOS
ALAMOS SCI. 131 (1987). For general background regarding Monte Carlo simulation, see
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tion of empirical and assumption-based analysis yields several important insights.
The primary claim of this Article is that a Hadley default rule is
more efficient than a full-damages default rule in the simple markets
studied. The extended claim is that markets with similar conditions
might also benefit from the Hadley rule. However, these findings are
subject to four important qualifications. First, the Hadley rule is not
preferable when high-value buyers systematically have a much
greater chance of incurring consequential damages. Second, a fulldamages default outperforms Hadley when most of the efficiency
gains from information revelation go to low-value buyers. Third, the
Hadley rule is not optimal when the transaction costs of contracting
around the default rule are much greater for high-value buyers than
low-value buyers. Finally, the analysis assumes perfect competition,
and introducing seller power into the empirical model might change
the results.
The discussion is organized as follows. Part II reviews the Hadley
literature, including the concern that economic models of Hadley are
indeterminate. Part III launches an empirical case study of the Hadley rule. More specifically, Part III.A develops a working model of
Hadley from the existing economic literature, and Part III.B uses
willingness-to-pay data to empirically estimate buyer valuations for
three simple markets. Part III.C combines this work with other variables to arrive at preliminary conclusions for each market. Part III.D
qualifies the findings by conducting sensitivity analysis. Part IV proposes additional research to test the Hadley rule in more complicated
markets. Finally, Part V suggests that the field of marketing may be
a ready-made source of data for contract law scholars. If so, it might
be premature to abandon empirical testing of economic theories, at
least for the question of consequential damage defaults. A brief conclusion summarizes the results.
II. THE HADLEY PROBLEM
A. The Significance of a British Miller
The classic contracts case Hadley v. Baxendale24 denies recovery
for unforeseeable consequential damages, that is, nonstandard damages beyond contemplation of the promisor at the time of contracting.25 Hadley, a British mill operator, contracted with Baxendale to
JAMES E. GENTLE, RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION AND MONTE CARLO METHODS (2d ed.
2003); PETER JÄCKEL, MONTE CARLO METHODS IN FINANCE (2002); and ISTVÁN MANNO,
INTRODUCTION TO THE MONTE-CARLO METHOD (1999).
24. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
25. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.14, at 255-57; MURRAY, supra note 3, § 120, at
783-85; PERILLO, supra note 3, § 14.5, at 569.
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deliver a broken shaft to a manufacturer, who needed the shaft as a
model to make the replacement.26 Unfortunately, Baxendale was delayed, and the mill shut down for five days.27 The court denied Hadley compensation for profits lost during this time period because they
were unforeseeable consequential damages.28
The case has come to represent an important limit to the general
rule awarding full expectation damages for breach.29 Damages are
divided into two types, general and consequential. General damages,
arising naturally in the usual course of breach, are routinely recoverable.30 Consequential damages, such as Hadley’s lost profits, are
not recoverable unless the loss is foreseeable at the time of contracting or the parties make alternative arrangements.31 In other words,
Hadley is a default rule that takes effect only when a contract is silent on the issue of consequential damages. Parties can contract
around it if they wish.32
Much of contract theory deals with this concept of selecting appropriate default rules to govern incomplete contracts.33 Parties cannot possibly anticipate everything that might happen over the course
of a contract. Even if they could, the costs of negotiating every con-

26. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 146.
27. Id.
28. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.14.
29. The Hadley rule receives widespread acceptance. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts adopts the rule as follows: “Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party
in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979). Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) codifies Hadley. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2003). The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods limits damages to losses
that the breaching party “foresaw or ought to have foreseen . . . as a possible consequence
of the breach of contract.” United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, art. 74, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
30. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.14, at 256.
31. Id. at 257, 259, 268.
32. In fact, many commercial contracts apparently modify this default rule to disclaim
liability for all consequential damages, whether foreseeable or not. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD
ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 281 n.16 (1994); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.14,
at 268. Richard Epstein puts it this way:
All in all, the optimal contracting strategy does not appear to call for the high
consequential damages, subject to defense rules, that courts have tended to
adopt. . . . [W]ithin the class of fixed damage awards, there is reason to expect
these damages to be kept relatively limited, which is what the express contracts have typically provided.
Epstein, supra note 21, at 118. See also infra note 49 (exploring UCC drafting committee
discussions to abandon the Hadley default rule for this reason).
33. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 1547 (“At the center of contract theory is the role
of default rules.”); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General Theories, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 1; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985).
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tingency may outweigh the benefits of planning for small-probability
events. As a result, no one drafts a complete contract.34
The law faces a choice, then, when parties to a contract come
across a contingency not addressed by the initial agreement. One option is to dismiss the contract entirely, expunging all contractual liability because the parties have not sufficiently stated a binding
agreement.35 A second option is to fill these contractual gaps somehow and enforce the enhanced contract instead.36 Economic analysis
claims to offer a basis for choosing efficient default rules to govern
incomplete contracts.
One way to select a default rule is to simply choose the term that
most parties would prefer at the time of contracting.37 This majoritarian approach to default rules allows the law to economize on
transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms that parties

34. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at 211-17; SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 299-301;
Craswell, supra note 33. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott recently put it this way:
“[C]ontracts will inevitably be incomplete. There is an infinite number of possible future
states and a very large set of possible partner types. When the sum of possible states and
partner types is infinite and contracting is costly, contracts must contain gaps. Parties
cannot write contracts about everything.” Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 594-95 (2003). Parties may also
remain silent for a number of strategic reasons. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 94;
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 760; Johnston, supra note 7.
35. Such is the approach taken in a number of classic common law cases. See, e.g.,
Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y. 1916) (holding a promise to give a “fair share of
[the] profits” sufficiently vague to render the contract unenforceable). The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts offers some support for this approach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1979) (“Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be
understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of
the contract are reasonably certain.”); id. § 33 cmt. b (“Contracts should be made by the
parties, not by the courts, and hence . . . remedies for breach of contract must have a basis
in the agreement of the parties.”); see also Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1643-61 (2003) (exploring situations where
courts refuse to enforce incomplete contracts).
36. This approach receives support from the Uniform Commercial Code, which often
seeks to supplement incomplete contracts with fair or reasonable terms, especially when
parties fail to specify less important terms. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2003) (inserting a
reasonable price when none is specified). For more general discussion, see Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 785
(1982). Other compromise approaches to enforcing incomplete contracts have also been
suggested. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately
Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389 (suggesting an intermediate solution, in some
circumstances, which holds parties partially accountable to honor incomplete contracts).
37. Craswell, supra note 33, at 2-5; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971
(1983). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts suggests that lawmakers should supply an
essential missing term with one “which is reasonable in the circumstances.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979). It has been suggested that this leads to the use of
majoritarian defaults. See Speidel, supra note 36; see also U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2003) (“[A]
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”).
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would otherwise have to adopt by express agreement.38 While it may
be fiction to retroactively divine the parties’ intentions, economists
can often reason that one term would have been selected over alternatives. Perhaps one party can better manage the risk, for example,
or avoid costs easier.39 By generalizing the preferences of many contracting parties in this manner—or even by looking historically at a
large number of executed contracts—lawmakers could conceivably
judge which default rules will minimize transaction costs.40
But, unfortunately, selecting default rules by majority preference
may not always lead to the most efficient outcome. A second strain of
economic theory suggests that lawmakers should, instead, sometimes
choose default rules preferred by a minority of parties.41 The reason
is this: minority defaults can, at times, lead to information sharing
that increases the overall welfare of an economic system.42 Selecting
the right default can prevent better-informed parties from taking advantage of less-informed parties by compelling information to come
forward that results in a greater social welfare.43
From an economic point of view, then, one key challenge is knowing whether to choose majoritarian defaults that save on transaction
costs or to choose penalty defaults that force information to be
shared. This tension plays out most directly in the economic literature evaluating Hadley.44 In fact, over time, the Hadley rule has

38. POSNER, supra note 6, § 4.1, at 96-97; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (1985) (“The legal
rule [of limited liability] enables firms to obtain . . . benefits . . . at lower cost.”).
39. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 254-56 (2004); Goetz &
Scott, supra note 37, at 971-76. For an example of this in practice, see National Distillers
& Chemical Corp. v. First National Bank of Highland Park, 804 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir.
1986), reasoning that “[a]mbiguities and gaps in contracts should be resolved by finding
what the parties would have bargained for had they addressed the matter explicitly at the
time.”
40. But see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227, 1272 (2003) (suggesting that behavioral economic effects may cause contract default rules to be “sticky,” preventing parties from efficiently contracting around the rules in
some cases); Korobkin, supra note 2, passim (suggesting that default rule preferences of
contracting parties may be influenced by the existing default rule).
41. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 93-95; Craswell, supra note 33, at 5-9.
42. The intuition behind these penalty defaults, or “information-forcing defaults,” is to
keep better-informed parties from strategically hiding socially valuable information during
contract formation. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 94. To get the information out, “it
may be efficient to choose a rule that a majority of people actually disfavor.” Id. at 95; see
also Gwyn D. Quillen, Note, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1125 (1988) (discussing cross-subsidization problems that result when better informed parties keep information private).
43. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 94, 99. This point is developed further infra
Parts II.B.1-2.
44. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 101-04; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note
5, at 284-87.
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taken on much greater significance as an archetype for the power of
contract default rules to efficiently expose asymmetric information.45
B. Theoretical “Solutions” to Hadley
The Hadley situation is usually modeled by dividing a population
of buyers into two classes: those with a low valuation of contract performance and those with a high valuation.46 For example, purchasers
of FedEx delivery services might be divided between buyers valuing
delivery greatly (perhaps they need to deliver important documents
to buy a house or apply for a job) and buyers with a low valuation of
performance (perhaps they need to send a newsletter or another routine document). Each buyer is risk-neutral and knows his valuation
type. The selling party has no way to distinguish one type of buyer
from the other and must rely instead on the buyer to reveal this private information. From a social point of view, it is desirable for sellers to know this information so they can take efficient precautions.47
For example, using the facts of Hadley, the carrier could hire another
employee to ensure timely delivery for the highest-value buyers.48
While many default rules might govern the issue of consequential
damages,49 two alternative rules are proposed: (1) a Hadley default
limiting unforeseeable consequential damages unless high-value
buyers reveal their type and (2) a full-damages default allowing highvalue buyers to recover everything without revealing any informa45. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1548-53; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 101-04;
Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 286. More generally, contracting under asymmetrical
information receives extensive treatment in the literature on game theory and the law.
See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 32, at 79-158.
46. A more realistic approach might be to model the value of performance by the two
classes of buyers as two continuous distributions with different means. Such an approach
is suggested by Adler, supra note 7, at 1561 n.38. This Article extends the analysis in this
manner. See infra Part III.
47. The model thus assumes that spending more on precautions will reduce the risk of
breach and therefore the expected damages suffered by each buyer for nonperformance.
Said another way, if the low-value and high-value buyers were conducting these activities
themselves, they would each take different levels of care, which would reflect the optimal
investments to reduce the risk of nonperformance. Other things being equal, one would
prefer a default rule that leads to identical results. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 32, at 15051; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 97-104; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 287-92.
48. This might make sense if the costs of hiring the extra employee were more than
offset by the benefits of a greater chance of timely delivery to Hadley. One can also imagine
an inefficient investment in precautions—for example, hiring ten police to fend off an unlikely attempt at highway robbery. Such an investment might result in a price greater
than what Hadley is willing to pay and is unlikely to occur once full negotiations have
taken place.
49. For example, some members of the drafting committee for the 2003 amendments
to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code considered imposing a default rule denying
recovery of all consequential damages from breach. Interview with William Henning, Former Chair, Drafting Committee to Revise UCC Article 2, in Tuscaloosa, Ala. (June 16,
2004). This discussion did not lead to a formal draft proposal, and amended Article 2 leaves
the Hadley rule in place. Id.
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tion.50 Which default rule will allow sellers to distinguish between
buyer types, thus enabling them to take efficient precautions that
maximize social welfare?51
1. The Majoritarian Solution
A lawmaker might argue that the Hadley default is preferable because it forces high-value buyers to reveal their type by negotiating
protection for unforeseeable consequential damages.52 Of course,
high-value buyers may initially resist disclosing this information to
avoid a price increase. But as long as sellers are best situated to in-

50. E.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 1554-59; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 108;
Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 289-92.
51. The concept of greater social efficiency through more tailored precautions can be
illustrated with a simple numerical example. Take a population of 100 buyers with a positively skewed distribution of performance valuations as follows (Figure 1a, supra p. 899,
displays this data visually):
VALUE PLACED ON
PERFORMANCE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
TOTAL
MEAN

NUMBER OF BUYERS
7
13
19
14
12
9
6
5
4
3
2
2
2
1
1
100
5.1

If sellers cannot distinguish among the types of buyers, they will take precautions reflecting the mean performance valuation of 5.1. However, if they can divide the buyers into just
two groups—those above the mean and those below the mean—then they can take precautions reflecting a mean value of 3.2 for the 65 low-value buyers and precautions reflecting
a mean value of 8.7 for the 35 high-value buyers. More granular knowledge of the performance valuations for different buyer classes results in two main benefits. First, sellers can
avoid wasting precautions on the 65 low-value buyers who would prefer a lower price and
higher chance of breach. Second, sellers can take additional precautions—greater than the
average levels taken when all buyers are pooled together—to increase the probability of
successful performance for the 35 high-value buyers. Social gains will continue to accrue
with increasing levels of granularity (for example, subdividing the two groups of buyers
into groups of four, eight, or ultimately down to groups of fifteen). Of course, these gains
may be offset by the increased transaction costs needed to obtain this granularity.
52. See Posner, supra note 11, at 836-37.
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vest in extra precautions,53 high-value buyers will realize that they
are better off paying the higher price and enjoying greater certainty
of performance.
But what happens if a full-damages default rule is adopted instead?
Now, high-value buyers will be compensated fully and need not reveal
their special circumstances.54 Low-value buyers, however, will prefer
that sellers take fewer precautions in exchange for a cheaper price.55
They will step forward to reveal this preference, allowing sellers to
again distinguish between buyer types and take more granular precautions.56 Thus, in theory, either the Hadley or the full-damages default
rule will expose private information and lead to efficient precautions.
Under a majoritarian approach, then, the optimal default rule is
simply a function of the underlying valuation distribution for the
market. The most efficient rule seeks only to minimize transaction
costs by putting in place a default that most buyers need not contract
around.57 Lawmakers should estimate the buyer valuation distribution for the market and select the default rule accordingly: if buyer
valuations skew positively (Figure 1a58), then a Hadley rule is best; if
they skew negatively (Figure 1b59), then a full-damages default
should be chosen. And if buyer valuations are normally distributed,
the consequential damages default rule may not matter.60
2. The Penalty Default Solution
In some cases, however, a Hadley default can be better even when
most buyers would not select this rule in advance. The logic is subtle:
majority defaults may not lead buyers to reveal their type, while a
penalty default rule—reflecting the preferences of fewer buyers—
may expose this information.61
This can happen because the majoritarian model of Hadley assumes
away important variables. For instance, the optimal default rule may depend
on the magnitude of transaction costs—the costs of contracting around a disliked default rule.62 Or the best rule may change if low-value and high-value
53. One would expect this to be true in many cases. However, independent insurance
markets, allowing buyers to self-insure if they wish, might exist for some types of contracts. This is ultimately another issue subject to empirical investigation.
54. See Craswell, supra note 33, at 7-8; Posner, supra note 11, at 836-37.
55. See Craswell, supra note 33, at 7-8; Posner, supra note 11, at 837.
56. See Craswell, supra note 33, at 7-8; Posner, supra note 11, at 837.
57. This analysis follows from Coasean contractual theory. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Johnston, supra note 7, at 623-25.
58. See supra p. 899 fig.1a.
59. See supra p. 899 fig.1b.
60. Posner, supra note 11, at 854.
61. Adler, supra note 7, at 1549-50; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 97-98; Bebchuk
& Shavell, supra note 5, at 290.
62. A majoritarian default might be appropriate if transaction costs are so small that
everyone contracts around inefficient defaults or so large that no one does so. See Ayres &

910

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:897

buyers face different transaction costs.63 The optimal default might also turn
on which buyers benefit the most from tailored precautions.64
Consider a situation where the majoritarian default leads to a poor outcome. Assume that a legal system selects a full-damages default to govern
the negatively skewed market shown in Figure 1b.65 This default is majoritarian because there are 65 high-value buyers who prefer a full-damages
rule and just 35 low-value buyers. But the transaction costs incurred by
low-value buyers to contract around the full-damages default may outweigh the gains that they receive from the seller taking fewer precautions.
If so, low-value buyers will not reveal their type, and sellers will take average precautions for the entire buyer pool rather than more efficient tailored
precautions. By contrast, this problem may not occur if lawmakers select a
Hadley default. If the gains from high-value buyers contracting around the
Hadley default rule sufficiently outweigh the transaction costs incurred,
then they will reveal their type. Under these circumstances, a default rule
preferred by a minority of buyers leads to greater social welfare, while a default rule preferred by the majority is less efficient.
A stylized numerical example may help illustrate this point.66 Under
this example, simplify the market in Figure 1b67 even further so that
there are 35 identical low-value buyers and 65 identical high-value buyers, and make the assumptions of Table 1.
TABLE 1
BUYER ASSUMPTIONS IN A NEGATIVELY SKEWED MARKET
BUYER TYPE

NUMBER

VALUATION ($)

COST TO CONTRACT
AROUND DEFAULT ($)
15

Low

35

50

High

65

500

Average

342.5

10

68

Gertner, supra note 5, at 114-15. But this need not be the case, and robust models will explicitly take transaction cost variables into account. Id. at 117-18; see also Alan Schwartz
& Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2, 3
(2004) (noting that “contracting and renegotiation costs are treated as exogenous parameters, commonly assumed to be either very high or very low” and then “explor[ing] the middle ground”).
63. Korobkin also explores this point. See Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1058.
64. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 116-18.
65. See supra p. 899 fig.1b. The distribution of buyer valuations for this market is the
inverse of the one described supra note 51.
66. This example is adapted from the framework established by Bebchuk and Shavell.
See Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 287-90 nn.9-17. Perfect competition is assumed,
and all seller costs except precautions are excluded for simplicity.
67. See supra p. 899 fig.1b.
68. This value is the weighted average of the low-value and high-value buyer valuations: (.35 * 50) + (.65 * 500) = 342.5.
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Assume further that sellers in a perfectly competitive market
can choose from three different levels of precautions, as indicated in
Table 2. Taking greater precautions increases the chances that sellers will successfully perform the contract, but doing so also costs
more. For example, sellers taking medium precautions incur $25 in
costs—which they pass on to buyers in perfect competition—and
these precautions lead to successful contract performance 60% of
the time.
TABLE 2
SELLER PRECAUTIONS ASSUMPTIONS
SELLER
PRECAUTION LEVEL

PROBABILITY OF
PERFORMING CONTRACT (%)

COST OF TAKING
PRECAUTION ($)

Low

40

5

Medium

60

25

High

80

100

With these assumptions, low-value buyers prefer contracts where
sellers take low precautions:69
Utilitylow = 50 (40%) – 5 = 15
Utilitymed = 50 (60%) – 25 = 5
Utilityhigh = 50 (80%) – 100 = -60
Conversely, high-value buyers prefer contracts where sellers take
high precautions:
Utilitylow = 500 (40%) – 5 = 195
Utilitymed = 500 (60%) – 25 = 275
Utilityhigh = 500 (80%) – 100 = 300
And if sellers cannot distinguish buyer types, they will take medium
precautions, reflecting average expected preferences:
Utilitylow = 342.5 (40%) – 5 = 132
Utilitymed = 342.5 (60%) – 25 = 180.5
Utilityhigh = 342.5 (80%) – 100 = 174
Now imagine that this legal system selects the majoritarian default rule of full damages. High-value buyers have no need to contract around this rule because they will be fully compensated under the default.70 But low-value buyers may choose to reveal their
type for a cheaper price.71 Will the economic system benefit if they

69. Buyer utility = [(valuation of successful performance) * (probability of successful
performance)] - cost of precautions.
70. See Posner, supra note 11, at 836-37.
71. Id. at 837.

912

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:897

do so? Consider the social welfare in each possible outcome (Table
3).
TABLE 3
SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER FULL-DAMAGES DEFAULT RULE
SOCIAL WELFARE

Low-value buyers contract
around default (separating72)
Low-value buyers do not
contract around default
(pooling75)

LOW-VALUE BUYERS

HIGH-VALUE
BUYERS

TOTAL

073

19,50074

19,500

17576

17,87577

18,050*

* Equilibrium result

If low-value buyers incur the costs of contracting around the
rule, the buyer population separates by type. Low-value buyers receive low precautions and high-value buyers receive high precautions (without incurring transaction costs). Conversely, if lowvalue buyers do not reveal their type, the population pools and
everyone receives medium precautions. Society is better off when
low-value buyers contract around the default rule (19,500 >
18,050), but they will not do so. Each low-value buyer faces a cost
of $15 to contract around the rule yet only benefits by $10—the
difference between utility with low precautions and utility with
medium precautions. The equilibrium is a pooling one where no
one reveals information.
In this example, however, the results change when the Hadley default is selected, even though fewer buyers prefer this rule. Now the
65 high-value buyers must decide whether to reveal their type. Con72. A separating equilibrium occurs when one group of buyers offers information
about their type, thus allowing the seller to distinguish between the groups of buyers and
take tailored precautions. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1557-58; Ayres & Gertner, supra note
5, at 111-23.
73. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) *
(utility to low-value buyer with low precautions – cost to low-value buyer of contracting
around default) = (35) * (15 - 15) = 0. Thus, in this context, social welfare is the sum of participant utility and excludes third-party effects.
74. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) *
(utility to high-value buyer with high precautions) = (65) * (300) = 19,500.
75. A pooling equilibrium occurs when no buyer group offers information about their
type, thus forcing the seller to take the same level of precautions for the entire buyer
“pool.” See Adler, supra note 7, at 1556; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 111-13.
76. This social welfare is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) * (utility
to low-value buyer with medium precautions) = (35) * (5) = 175.
77. This social welfare is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) * (utility to high-value buyer with medium precautions) = (65) * (275) = 17,875.
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sider the resulting social welfare under both outcomes as shown in
Table 4.
TABLE 4
SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER HADLEY DEFAULT RULE
SOCIAL WELFARE
LOW-VALUE BUYERS

HIGH-VALUE
BUYERS

TOTAL

High-value buyers contract around default (separating)

52578

18,85079

19,375*

High-value buyers do not
contract around default
(pooling)

17580

17,87581

18,050

* Equilibrium result

Social welfare is greater when high-value buyers contract around
the Hadley default rule (19,375 > 18,050), and they will do so. The
increase in utility when they move from medium precautions to high
precautions, a net gain of $25, outweighs the transaction costs of $10.
While the greatest social welfare comes when low-value buyers contract around a full-damages default,82 this outcome never occurs.
Hadley thus offers the best obtainable outcome.
This example illustrates how self-interested buyer behavior sometimes prevents majoritarian defaults from exposing socially valuable
information. Different assumptions, of course, might support majoritarian defaults.83 The penalty-default solution to Hadley argues that
limited consequential damages should sometimes be imposed to force
efficient precautions, even though the rule may be preferred by few
contracting parties. This means that lawmakers considering the

78. This social welfare is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) * (utility
to low-value buyer with low precautions) = (35) * (15) = 525.
79. This social welfare is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) * (utility to high-value buyer with high precautions – cost to high-value buyer of contracting
around default) = (65) * (300 - 10) = 18,850.
80. Calculated as in supra note 76.
81. Calculated as in supra note 77.
82. This is true because total transaction costs incurred when low-value buyers contract
around the default (35 * 15 = 525) are less than the total transaction costs incurred when highvalue buyers do so (65 * 10 = 650). Cf. Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 288-89, 295 (discussing socially optimal behavior of buyers and sellers where, in contrast to this model, contracting
high-buyers have lower transaction costs because they are in the minority). This need not always be the case. If, for example, transaction costs of high-value buyers are reduced to $5, the
resulting welfare when they contract around the Hadley default is 19,700—which exceeds the
social welfare when low-value buyers contract around the full-damages default.
83. For example, reducing transaction costs for low-value buyers to $5 would cause
them to separate in a full-damages regime. A majoritarian default thus results in the most
efficient outcome.
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Hadley rule ought to analyze more than just the number of highvalue and low-value buyers in a market. Additional buyer data—
including the magnitude of performance valuations, costs incurred
when contracting for other rules, and efficiency gains from tailored
precautions—are needed to select the better default rule.
3. Introducing Stochastic Damages
The solution gets more complicated, however, when consequential
damages are stochastic (occurring with some probability) instead of
certain.84 Using the facts of Hadley, imagine, for example, that there
was only some chance that the miller would lose profits from a delayed delivery—maybe he was searching neighboring mills for a
spare shaft.85 Barry Adler recently modeled this nuance,86 finding
that the change narrows the circumstances where penalty defaults
lead to the optimal outcome.87 A few changes to the previous example
are reflected in Table 5, which will illustrate this point.
TABLE 5
REVISED BUYER ASSUMPTIONS
BUYER
TYPE

NUMBER

VALUATION:
GENERAL
DAMAGES ($)

VALUATION:
CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES ($)

PROBABILITY
OF INCURRING
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES

88

(%)

COST TO
CONTRACT

AROUND
DEFAULT
($)

Low

35

25

75

60

15

High

65

25

475

90

10

25

33589

79.5

Average

Buyer valuation is now split between general damages and consequential damages, and the Hadley rule is modeled differently. Consequential damages incurred by low-value buyers are considered foreseeable and, thus, recoverable under Hadley.90 Consequential damages
beyond this amount are unforeseeable. High- and low-value buyers

84. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1560.
85. Or, to borrow from Adler, imagine that Hadley hired a mechanic who had a
chance to fix the mill without the missing mill shaft. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1561-70.
88. For simplicity, this probability of incurring consequential damages is modeled
with certainty. Cf. id. at 1561 n.38 (using a simplified presentation to convey the general
idea). The working model used infra Part III.A models this variable stochastically.
89. This value is the weighted average of the low-value and high-value buyer consequential damages: (.35 * 75) + (.65 * 475) = 335. Similarly, the average probability of incurring consequential damages is the weighted probability of low- and high-value buyers.
90. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1562.
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also have different chances of suffering consequential damages.
In this stylized example, then, the first $75 in consequential damages is foreseeable, while the incremental $400 incurred by high-value
buyers is not. High-value buyers also suffer damages with greater probability. Assumptions for seller precautions remain the same.
With this modeling refinement, high-value buyers are more likely
to conceal their type inefficiently, even under a Hadley default. As
before, low-value buyers prefer contracts where sellers take low precautions,91 high-value buyers prefer contracts where sellers take high
precautions,92 and sellers take medium precautions when they are
unable to distinguish buyer type.93 Under a full-damages regime, the
outcome mirrors the earlier example. Table 6 illustrates this point.
TABLE 6
REVISED SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER FULL-DAMAGES DEFAULT RULE
SOCIAL WELFARE
LOW-VALUE
BUYERS

HIGH-VALUE
BUYERS

TOTAL

Low-value buyers contract around
default (separating)

28094

17,03095

17,310

Low-value buyers do not contract
around default (pooling)

59596

16,02397

16,618*

* Equilibrium result

91. The calculation here is slightly more complicated, as buyer utility under each precaution level now depends on the probability of consequential damages occurring. Thus, the
equation for buyer utility is as follows: [probability of no consequential damages * ((general
damages * the probability of successful performance) – the cost of precautions)] + [probability
of consequential damages * (((general damages + consequential damages) * the probability of
successful performance) – the cost of precautions)]. Using this formula for low-value buyers,
Utilitylow = [40% * ((25 * 40%) - 5)] + [60% * (((25 + 75) * 40%) - 5)] = 23
Utilitymed = 17
Utilityhigh = -44
92. For high-value buyers,
Utilitylow = [10% * ((25 * 40%) - 5)] + [90% * ((25 + 475) * 40%) - 5)] = 176
Utilitymed = 246.5
Utilityhigh = 262
93. For average buyers,
Utilitylow = [20.5% * ((25 * 40%) - 5)] + [79.5% * (((25 + 335) * 40%) - 5)] = 111.5
Utilitymed = 149.8
Utilityhigh = 133.1
94. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) *
(value to low-value buyer with low precautions – cost to low-value buyer of contracting
around default) = (35) * (23 - 15) = 280.
95. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) *
(value to high-value buyer with high precautions) = (65) * (262) = 17,030.
96. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) *
(value to low-value buyer with medium precautions) = (35) * (17) = 595.
97. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) *
(value to high-value buyer with medium precautions) = (65) * (246.5) = 16,023.
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Social welfare is greater if low-value buyers separate (17,310 >
16,618), but instead they will pool. Transaction costs of $15 exceed the
net benefit of $6 that accrues to low-value buyers moving from medium to low precautions.98
In the earlier example, instituting a Hadley default resulted in a
switch from a pooling equilibrium to a separating one. But this time,
changing the default rule will not cause separation. Clearly, social welfare
is again greater with buyer separation, as Table 7 illustrates. Furthermore, the gains to high-value buyers moving from medium to high precautions ($15.5) exceed the transaction costs of contracting around the default rule ($10).99 But high-value buyers must now pay an additional cost
if they identify their type: sellers will charge them for the higher probability of incurring the initial $75 in consequential damages.100 In this example, high-value buyers pay an extra $7.88 when identifying their type.101
Facing this calculus, high-value buyers keep quiet;102 this results in a
pooling equilibrium—even with the Hadley rule.
TABLE 7
REVISED SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER HADLEY DEFAULT RULE
SOCIAL WELFARE
LOW-VALUE
BUYERS

HIGH-VALUE
BUYERS

TOTAL

High-value buyers contract around default (separating)

805103

16,380104

17,185

High-value buyers do not contract
around default (pooling)

595105

16,023106

16,618*

* Equilibrium result

This does not mean that penalty defaults never work.107 It means
only that they may work less frequently than otherwise believed.108 A

98. See supra p. 914 tbl.5 and note 91.
99. See supra p. 914 tbl.5 and note 92.
100. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1565-66 (describing a similar scenario between shippers and carriers).
101. This additional cost is calculated as follows: (probability of consequential damages
for high-value buyers – probability of consequential damages for average buyers) * foreseeable consequential damages = (90% - 79.5%) * 75 = 7.88.
102. $15.50 in benefits < $17.88 in total costs.
103. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) *
(value to low-value buyer with low precautions) = (35) * (23) = 805.
104. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) *
(value to high-value buyer with high precautions – cost to high-value buyers of contracting
around default) = (65) * (262 - 10) = 16,380.
105. This social welfare value is calculated as in supra note 96.
106. This social welfare value is calculated as in supra note 97.
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nuanced model of Hadley, then, needs to add variables for the
chances that high-value and low-value buyers will incur consequential damages.
In summary, the choice of a default rule to govern consequential
damages depends on several variables, including (1) the magnitude
and distribution of valuations that buyers place on contract performance;109 (2) the transaction costs incurred when high-value buyers
bargain around a Hadley default or when low-value buyers bargain
around a full-damages default;110 (3) the social efficiency gains when
high- or low-value buyers disclose private information, thus enabling
more tailored precautions against breach;111 and (4) the probability
that high-value or low-value buyers will incur consequential damages in breach.112 Given this complexity, it may be difficult for lawmakers to unpack these variables and determine which default rule
should apply in any given context. One commentator has remarked
that “accurate evaluation of a penalty-default rule’s efficacy in the
Hadley setting could be a heroic task.”113
C. The Indeterminacy Concern with Economic Contracts
Scholarship
Eric Posner takes the argument further, suggesting that complex
economic models of contract law—including the Hadley model for
consequential damages—are indeterminate.114 In his view, economic
analysis of contract law has become so complicated that the theories
do not lead to observable implications or concrete normative suggestions. The argument is twofold. First, key variables in the economic

107. To see this in the example, change low-value buyer consequential damages from
$75 to $25. With this modified assumption, the gains to high-value buyers from identifying
themselves outweigh the costs of doing so, and buyers separate under the Hadley rule.
108. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1551-54. Responses to Adler’s article echo this belief.
See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 92-93; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 8, at 1618-19.
109. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 101-02.
110. See id. at 97-100.
111. See Bebchuck & Shavell, supra note 5, at 287-89.
112. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1560. Other refinements to the model are possible.
Most notably, Jason Scott Johnston has introduced a game theoretical model of the Hadley
rule where he relaxes assumptions of perfectly competitive markets. See Johnston, supra
note 7, at 626-39. In other words, sellers are no longer “identical price-taking firms.” Id. at
625. This introduces an incentive for sellers to learn about buyer valuations, not for the
purpose of taking efficient precautions but rather to increase their individual profits. Id. at
625-26. It also introduces another dimension of information revelation, as buyers would
now like to learn whether different sellers have different probabilities of breach. See id. at
625-26. Other commentators emphasize the complications of crafting defaults in markets
with seller power. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 732-33; Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 397-99
(1993).
113. Adler, supra note 7, at 1552.
114. See Posner, supra note 11, at 830.
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models cannot be estimated with any degree of confidence.115 Second,
even if one variable can be measured in isolation, there is no way to
aggregate all of a model’s variables to obtain meaningful outcomes.116
Take each argument in turn.
The first claim is that key variables are too hard to measure. In
other words, “we [do not] have enough empirical data to be able to
guess which rule is based on assumptions that are closer to reality.”117 For Hadley, an example of an indeterminate variable might be
the distribution of buyer valuations. How could lawmakers ever estimate the range of values for a given contract? What is the relevant
population? How would they gather a sample? Why would participants ever feel compelled to reveal their actual valuation?118 If there
is truly no way to estimate this variable empirically, then it may be
impossible to state an optimal default rule for consequential damages.
More generally, if most economic models of contract law contain
unverifiable terms, then economic analysis may be of little use. Models lacking a basis for empirical testing will ultimately fail to provide
guidance to lawmakers. Even if more sophisticated models refine the
variables and circumstances under which different default rules are
preferable, they will remain indeterminate. Other approaches are
needed to fill contract gaps at a more granular level.119

115. Id. at 864-65.
116. Id. at 865.
117. Id. at 837.
118. Posner concludes that “[n]o one has tried to determine the shape of this distribution through empirical research, and indeed it is hard to imagine how this could be done.”
Id. at 854. Barry Adler puts it this way: “A determination [of the optimal default rule] depends on perhaps unobtainable information about the full range of each type’s [(high-value
and low-value buyers)] expected damages from breach.” Adler, supra note 7, at 1552.
119. Or maybe contract gaps should not be filled at all. Alan Schwartz and Robert
Scott suggest that lawmakers should dismiss contracts that run into contingencies not
spelled out explicitly, at least for contracts between sophisticated parties. See Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 34, at 594-609. They support this approach by arguing that most stateimposed default rules are inefficient and do not address the myriad of situations that occur
in contract law. See id. at 598-601. Instead of lowering transaction costs, these rules may
force parties to contract around the defaults and raise the overall costs of contracting. See
id. at 608; Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 85 (2003) (stating that if parties do not like a legislatively enacted term, they will “expend resources
drafting their own term[s]”). The buyer and seller would then be free to renegotiate terms
or abandon the deal entirely. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 34, at 594-609. Ultimately, the
parties might come to understand the consequences of this approach and adjust their contracting strategies accordingly. Id. Of course, this refusal to set default rules would itself
be a type of default rule. Richard Craswell puts it this way:
The law could, of course, simply refuse to enforce any contract . . . that fell
short of absolute completeness. But such a rule would itself be a ‘default rule’:
it would be a legal rule defining the obligations (or lack of obligations) that result when a contract does not itself specify what rules should govern. As long as
actual contracts fall short of full completeness, then, the existence of default
rules is not so much a choice as a logical necessity.
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The second claim is that the overall effects of multiple variables
cannot be summed.120 In the Hadley context, even if lawmakers can
estimate buyer valuation distributions with confidence, they would
still need to estimate all of the other variables for the same population and aggregate the impact. How significant are the transaction
costs? What are the efficiency gains from more tailored precautions?
And what are the interactions between each of these variables? The
optimal default rule could only be selected upon completion of this
arduous analytic work.121
In fact, there may be further concerns. Suppose lawmakers can
measure, with some confidence, all relevant variables in a single experiment, thus solving the “vague variable” and “summing-up” problems. And imagine that they do this over several different markets.
It is entirely possible that the optimal default rule in one market is
empirically different than the optimal rule in another. Maybe the
valuation distribution curves of home construction, for example,
skew negatively, indicating a preference for a full-damages default,
while valuations of delivery contracts skew positively, advocating a
Hadley rule. In this case, should lawmakers prefer customized default rules—where each market gets its optimal default—or, in the
interests of contracting certainty, should they select just one global
default for the issue of consequential damages?122 A parallel problem
exists for heterogeneous contractors within a single market.123
Should lawmakers use Hadley for one set of home builders and full
damages for another? These choices raise fundamental jurisprudential issues of rules versus standards that permeate many areas of the
law.124
At its heart, though, Posner’s challenge to economic contracts
scholarship highlights a need for empiricism. If key variables are
truly immeasurable, then the economic approach to contract default
rules may be futile. But if there are ways to get at the variables—or
at least at some of the variables—empirically, then economic models
may offer a tangible foundation for reforming contract law. Posner

Craswell, supra note 33, at 2.
120. Posner, supra note 11, at 838, 880.
121. Id. at 836-37.
122. This tension is raised in Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 125-27.
123. Id.; see also Craswell, supra note 33, at 4-5.
124. For greater discussion of rules versus standards in the contracts context, see
Craswell, supra note 14, at 908-09; and Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and
Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004). On the rules versus
standards issue more generally, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976); and Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).

920

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:897

acknowledges that empirical analysis could conceivably spark a “renaissance” in the economic study of contract doctrine:
[Economic] models enjoy some intellectual advantages . . . for they
would enable us to make complex and interesting predictions
about contract law if we had sufficient information about empirical
conditions. But because we do not have such information, and it
is—in my view, though others might disagree—unlikely that we
ever would, the complex economic theories do not get us much
closer to an understanding of contract law . . . .125

And so far, empirical scholarship in contract law is indeed rare. A
recent review of contracts scholarship in over 500 law journals from
1985 to 2000 yields just twenty-seven empirical articles, a surprisingly small body of work.126 In actuality, economists—largely outside
the legal academy—have compiled a substantial body of empirical
work on contracts, examining the contract terms selected in specific
markets or situations.127 But this work rarely considers explicit doctrinal implications for contract law.128 Said differently, the models of
contract default rules developed by legal scholars have been subjected to little empirical testing. This is true even though scholars often call for empirical study.129
An empirical analysis of Hadley, then, might take on a greater
significance. If key variables can be measured empirically, a growing
body of scholarship could test and refine economic models of contract
125. Posner, supra note 11, at 864-65.
126. See Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1036-37. Korobkin explains his results as follows:
Despite the fact that . . . contract law is a relatively rich area for legal scholarship, I was able to identify fewer than thirty articles relevant to this review,
and many of these either only arguably meet the definition of “empirical” or
provide a tenuous link between the data gathered and any contract doctrine.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Also see supra note 20 for other sources of evidence that nonempirical approaches to contract doctrine are much more prevalent.
127. See, e.g., Douglas Allen & Dean Lueck, Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture:
Cash Rent Versus Cropshare, 35 J.L. & ECON. 397 (1992); Victor P. Goldberg & John R.
Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON. 369 (1987). For a survey of this work, see Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, Testing Contract Theory: A Recent Survey of Some Work, in 1
ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 115 (Mathias
Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003). While this literature dates back to the 1980s, much of the
work has occurred in the past five years. Id. at 142. And even here, “the empirical validation of the theory has long lagged behind the theoretical work.” Id. at 115.
128. See Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1036 (“[A]lthough there is a very large body of
empirical studies of contracting, there is extremely little empirical contract law scholarship
being produced in the legal academy today.”).
129. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 900
(2003) (“I join [Eric] Posner in welcoming and predicting a shift from the theoretical to the
empirical.”); Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1061 (“[T]he surprising dearth of empirical research in contract law scholarship . . . presents a sizeable opportunity for scholars to help
to define an emerging field.”); Schwartz & Watson, supra note 62, at 23 (“That so little data
exist relating contract costs to contract form implies the need for serious empirical research.”).
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law. The next Part turns to this possibility through a case study assessing the Hadley rule.
III. AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY OF HADLEY V. BAXENDALE
This Part launches an empirical case study of the Hadley rule.
Part III.A describes the model used for the test.130 Part III.B presents
data from several marketing studies and uses this data to empirically estimate buyer valuation distributions in three simple markets.
Part III.C runs Monte Carlo simulations to incorporate the effects of
multiple variables. These simulations indicate that a Hadley default
typically generates more welfare than a full-damages default in each
market studied. Finally, Part III.D qualifies these findings by conducting sensitivity analysis on other variables in the model.
A. Developing a Working Model of Hadley
Under the empirical model of Hadley, one hundred buyers must
first decide whether to contract with a seller. Each buyer has a different valuation of contract performance (VALUE) chosen randomly
from a predetermined probability distribution.131 This valuation is
split between general damages (GD) and consequential damages
(CD). Specifically, the first portion of damages is deemed general—up
to a constant assumption for GD—and the balance of VALUE is
CD.132 General damages always occur with breach, but buyers may
not incur consequential damages.133 The probability of suffering consequential damages (PROBCD) is determined randomly for each
buyer, again from a known distribution of values.134
The seller may take low, medium, or high precautions for each
buyer. Greater levels of precautions increase the probability of successful contract performance (PROBLOW, PROBMED, PROBHIGH)
but also cost more (COSTLOW, COSTMED, COSTHIGH). Without
130. The model is also available, upon request, from the author, at ggeis@law.ua.edu.
The model is built in Microsoft Excel, and users will also need to download and install
Crystal Ball, an Excel add-in simulation program available from Decisioneering at
http://crystalball.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
131. The shape and parameters of the probability distribution differ for each market
and are derived empirically. See infra Part III.B.
132. If the random VALUE for any buyer is less than the constant assumption for GD,
then all damages are considered general. For example, if general damages are assumed to
be $0.20 and buyer number 26 values contract performance at just $0.15, then all of that
buyer’s damages are deemed general (GD = $0.15), and no damages are consequential (CD
= $0.00).
133. Cf. Adler, supra note 7, at 1560 (modeling consequential damages stochastically).
134. Initial values are selected from a normal probability distribution with a mean of
90%, a standard deviation of 5%, a minimum value of 0%, and a maximum value of 100%
(the tails of the normal distribution below 0% and above 100% are distributed proportionately along the rest of the curve). Changes to this distribution are discussed infra Part
III.D.1.

922

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:897

knowing a buyer’s specific valuation, the seller will take precautions
reflecting the average buyer’s preference.135
Most buyers sort into low-, medium-, or high-value buyers based
on their preferred level of precautions. This is determined by calculating the expected utility for each buyer under the three precaution
levels according to the following formula (where x is low, medium, or
high):
Utilityx = ((1 – PROBCD) * (GD * PROBx – COSTx)) + (PROBCD *
((GD + CD) * PROBx – COSTx))
Buyers with very low valuations may refuse to contract because they
derive no utility under any level of precautions. These null buyers
are excluded from further analysis.
FIGURE 2
BUYER DECISION FLOWCHART

All other buyers must then decide whether to inform sellers of
their valuation type. As Figure 2 illustrates, they make this decision
based on four factors: (1) the legal default rule (Hadley or full damages), (2) the net benefits of moving to tailored precautions (Ulow,
Umed, or Uhigh), (3) the transaction costs required to contract
around the default (TCLOW or TCHIGH), and (4) the cost or benefit
of revealing their probability of suffering consequential damages.
This last factor relates to the additional information costs modeled by
Adler and is, thus, labeled IC in Figure 2.136 If PROBCD for a buyer
135. Thus it is also assumed that sellers know the overall probability function for
buyer valuations but not the actual valuation for any given buyer. See Bebchuk & Shavell,
supra note 5, at 285. Similarly, there is no other way for buyers to signal their type to sellers. See id.; cf. id. at 285 (modeling the Hadley problem in this manner).
136. Adler, supra note 7, at 1565-66.
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exceeds the average probability of incurring consequential damages,
then he will be charged a higher price. Conversely, if PROBCD is below average, the buyer will enjoy another benefit from revealing his
type.137
More specifically, high-value buyers will reveal their type under a
Hadley default rule when the benefits of moving from medium to
high precautions outweigh the transaction costs and information
costs of doing so.138 Low-value buyers will reveal their type under a
full-damages default rule when the benefits of moving from medium
to low precautions outweigh the costs.139 Since medium-value buyers
prefer medium precautions, they have no incentive to reveal their
type under either default rule.
FIGURE 3
SELLER DECISION FLOWCHART

The seller must then choose how to treat each buyer, as Figure 3
illustrates. For the purposes of this model, buyers refusing to contract will be ignored in further analysis and buyers revealing their
type will be given their requested level of precautions. But how
should the seller treat silent buyers? There are two options. If few
other contracting buyers have revealed their type, then the seller
may continue to take average precautions for all silent buyers. Alternatively, if many other buyers reveal their type, the seller may deduce that silent buyers want more tailored precautions (that is, low

137. Id. This assumes there are no reliability concerns with the buyer’s information
revelation.
138. Utilityhigh – Utilitymed > TCHIGH + IC
139. Utilitylow – Utilitymed > TCLOW + IC
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precautions in a Hadley regime or high precautions in a full-damages
regime).
Separation variables (SEPHIGH and SEPLOW) are used to model
this seller decision regarding precaution levels. If the proportion of
contracting buyers140 who reveal their type exceeds the variable, then
sellers will take tailored precautions for everyone (including medium
buyers) and a separating equilibrium results.141 Conversely, if the
number of revealing buyers falls short of the separation variable, a
pooling equilibrium results and all silent buyers receive medium precautions.
FIGURE 4
SOCIAL WELFARE FLOWCHART: FULL-DAMAGES DEFAULT

After all decisions take place, the model calculates total social welfare under both default rules for the given set of 100 buyers. Null
buyers generate no welfare. Under a full-damages default, as illustrated in Figure 4, high- and medium-value buyers contribute utilityhigh under a separation equilibrium and utilitymedium under a pooling
one. Low-value buyers revealing their type contribute utilitylow mi-

140. Buyers refusing to contract at all (null buyers) are ignored in this calculation.
141. For example, as initially modeled, under a Hadley default at least 20% of all contracting buyers need to identify themselves as high-value buyers before the nonidentifying
buyers (low-value buyers, medium-value buyers, and high-value buyers refusing to identify
their type) receive low precautions. If less than 20% of high-value buyers reveal their type,
then nonidentifying buyers receive medium precautions. Of course, buyers choosing to
identify their type will continue to receive their bargained-for level of precautions. As will
become apparent through sensitivity analysis, this is an important variable. See infra Part
III.D.4.
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nus the transaction costs incurred.142 Low-value buyers remaining silent are treated like high- and medium-value buyers.
The social welfare calculations are similar under a Hadley default,
as Figure 5 illustrates. Low- and medium-value buyers contribute
utilitylow if the buyer population separates and utilitymedium if it does
not. If they remain silent, high-value buyers contribute the same
utility as low- and medium-value buyers. If they reveal their type,
they contribute utilityhigh minus transaction costs.
FIGURE 5
SOCIAL WELFARE FLOWCHART: HADLEY DEFAULT

Finally, once both sets of calculations are made, the total social
welfare under each default rule can be compared to determine the
more efficient default. An easy way to summarize the results is to
calculate the net benefit of a Hadley default by subtracting the total
social welfare under a full-damages regime from the total social welfare under a Hadley regime. A positive number means that Hadley
outperforms full-damages. A negative number means that fulldamages is a better approach.
But the real power of simulation modeling comes from the ability
to play out the efficiency effects of both default rules hundreds or
thousands of times. In each trial, a different set of 100 buyers is
generated, and the net benefit (or cost) of a Hadley default is recalculated. Taken together, this analysis leads to a much greater un142. Information costs are excluded from the utility calculation because they are
merely transferred from buyer to seller. In other words, these costs play into the buyer’s
decision but are not a deadweight loss for social welfare.
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derstanding of the better default rule for a given market, along with
the likely range of outcomes. Before running the simulations, however, the distribution of buyer valuations must be derived empirically for the three markets to be studied.
B. Estimating the Distribution of Buyer Valuations Empirically
1. Data and Methodology
Across the quadrangles of most universities, scholars in the field
of marketing have long been interested in estimates of buyer valuation, although they call this variable by another name: willingness to
pay (WTP).143 Marketing researchers need WTP data to estimate
product demand and to set prices.144 WTP also becomes the yardstick
by which new products (or modifications to existing products) must
be measured. Over the years, marketing researchers have developed
several techniques for estimating buyer WTP, which they use to conduct vast numbers of empirical studies.145

143. See, e.g., SATTLER & VÖLCKNER, supra note 22, at 2 passim (analyzing “four methods
of measuring willingness-to-pay”); Smith & Nagle, supra note 22 (explaining why pricing
strategy should include estimation of buyer value in addition to willingness to pay); Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22 (examining various methods for determining buyer willingness
to pay).
144. The typical use of marketing research in this context is not just for setting
spot prices but, more broadly, for seeking an actionable consumer segmentation that
allows sellers to capture consumer surplus through more sophisticated price discrimination. This requires sellers to estimate the distribution of buyer valuations, translate
this data into a demand curve, identify a given customer’s position on the demand
curve, and price accordingly. See, e.g., K ENT B. M ONROE, P RICING: M AKING
PROFITABLE D ECISIONS 26-54 (3d ed. 2003); David Besanko et al., Competitive Price
Discrimination Strategies in a Vertical Channel Using Aggregate Retail Data, 49
MGMT. SCI. 1121 (2003); Andrea Shepard, Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration, 99 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1991). On the use of WTP methods to determine demand for
private goods, see, for example, Diane Bruce Anstine, How Much Will Consumers Pay?
A Hedonic Analysis of the Cable Television Industry, 19 R EV . INDUS. O RG . 129 (2001);
Philip M. Clarke, Valuing the Benefits of Mobile Mammographic Screening Units Using the Contingent Valuation Method, 32 A PPLIED ECON. 1647 (2000); and George
Dranitsaris et al., The Economic Value of a New Insulin Preparation, Humalog® Mix
25™: Measured by a Willingness-to-Pay Approach, 18 P HARMACO ECONOMICS 275
(2000). On the use of WTP methods—especially contingent valuation—to determine
the demand for public goods, see, for example, Catherine M. Chambers & John C.
Whitehead, A Contingent Valuation Estimate of the Benefits of Wolves in Minnesota,
26 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 249 (2003); Adam Finn et al., Valuing the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation, 27 J. CULTURAL ECON. 177 (2003); and Dale Whittington et
al., Estimating the Willingness to Pay for Water Services in Developing Countries: A
Case Study of the Use of Contingent Valuation Surveys in Southern Haiti, 38 ECON.
D EV . & CULTURAL CHANGE 293 (1990).
145. These techniques include actual transactions studies, contingent valuation,
incentive-compatible auctions, and lottery procedures, such as the Becker, DeGroot,
and Marschak (BDM) procedure. In historical data studies, researchers gather scanner data or other historical sales data to view buyer reactions at different price points.
See, e.g., Alvin J. Silk & Glen L. Urban, Pre-Test-Market Evaluation of New Packaged
Goods: A Model and Measurement Methodology, 15 J. M ARKETING RES. 171 (1978)
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In 2002, Klaus Wertenbroch and Bernd Skiera published a series
of experiments in the Journal of Marketing Research where they estimated a population’s WTP for three simple consumer products: a
can of Coca-Cola, a piece of pound cake, and a type of ergonomic
pen.146 The technique used in these studies is called the Becker,
DeGroot, and Marschak (BDM) procedure,147 which the authors find
more reliable than other WTP measurement techniques.148 Wertenbroch and Skiera have agreed to share the data from these studies
for use in this Article.

(discussing the use of the ASSESSOR model to estimate sales potential of new products). Contingent valuation measures buyer WTP via stated preferences, looking to
behavioral intentions and responses to hypothetical choices. See, e.g., R OBERT
CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, U SING SURVEYS TO VALUE P UBLIC GOODS:
THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 2 (1989); Richard T. Carson, Contingent Valuation: A User’s Guide, 34 E NVTL. SCI . & T ECH. 1413 (2000). Incentive-compatible auctions are designed to give all bidders the incentive to reveal their true WTP. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 228-29. One example is a Vickrey auction, which allocates products to the highest bidder at the price offered by the second-highest bidder. See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN . 8, 20-23 (1961). Finally, the BDM procedure uses a random-number
lottery process to determine a consumer’s willingness to pay. See Gordon M. Becker,
Morris H. DeGroot & Jacob Marschak, Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential Method, 9 B EHAV . SCI. 226, 228-30 (1964). Although other researchers characterize the BDM lottery procedure as a type of incentive-compatible technique, see
Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, it is worth distinguishing between the two because BDM is not an auction as traditionally understood. While both techniques are
incentive compatible in that they give buyers every incentive to reveal true WTP,
BDM can be conducted with just one buyer, at the point of purchase, and does not involve multiparty bidding.
146. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 231-37.
147. See Becker, DeGroot & Marschak, supra note 145 (setting forth the BDM procedure). The description of the BDM procedure in this Article is adapted from the studies
conducted by Wertenbroch and Skiera. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 230-32,
235.
148. The studies find that the BDM procedure outperforms contingent valuation on
measures of face, internal, and criterion validity. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note
22, at 232-34. Face validity was determined by correlating final offer prices with a
number of other questions, such as “How thirsty/hungry are you right now?” and “How
much do you like Coca-Cola/cake?” Id. at 232 tbl.2. Internal validity was determined
using logit analysis of purchase probabilities to estimate demand and by correlations
between observed and expected demand. Id. at 233; see also David Flath & E.W. Leonard, A Comparison of Two Logit Models in the Analysis of Qualitative Marketing
Data, 16 J. M ARKETING RES. 533, 534-36 (1979) (describing a logit model as a binary
model using logistic distribution). Criterion validity was determined by the “percentage of consumers that followed through with their purchase obligation” and other
post-transaction questions, such as how satisfied the consumer was with his purchase
and whether he wished that he had bid higher. Id. at 233-34.
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FIGURE 6
OVERVIEW OF THE BECKER, DEGROOT, AND MARSCHAK PROCEDURE

Figure 6 provides an overview of how the BDM procedure works.149 A
participant is presented with an opportunity to purchase a product at a
price no greater than what she is willing to pay. The seller describes the
product and gives instructions, and the participant makes an offer. The
seller may give the participant a chance to revise the offer after emphasizing that the participant has every incentive to bid her true WTP. After the participant makes the final offer (O), the buying price (P) is randomly chosen—perhaps the participant draws P from an urn or a computer generates P—from a prespecified distribution.150 If P is less than
or equal to O, the participant has a buying obligation at price P. If P is
greater than O, she has no buying opportunity.151
149. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 230 fig.1.
150. The random numbers in the urn or computer model are typically taken from a
reasonable distribution of price increments. For example, experiments selling a can of
Coca-Cola may use random numbers ranging from $0.25 to $1.50, increasing in $0.05 increments. Cf. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 231. To avoid anchoring effects,
sellers do not disclose this price distribution to participants. For a discussion on the distorting effects of anchoring, see Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the
Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 120, 123-26 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); and
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128-30 (1974).
151. For example, if the participant offers $20 and selects a random price of $15 from
the urn, then she must buy the product for $15. By contrast, if she selects a random price
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Conducted under these conditions, the BDM procedure should induce the participant to reveal her true WTP.152 For example, if she
bids $10 below her WTP and P is randomly selected at $5 below her
WTP, she loses consumer surplus by missing the buying opportunity.
If she bids $10 above her WTP and the random number selected is $5
greater than her WTP, she must purchase at a price greater than her
valuation. Finally, the ultimate price is determined exogenously from
the offer, giving her every incentive to reveal true WTP.153
The BDM procedure may provide reliable valuation data for several
other reasons. First, unlike some other WTP estimation techniques, it
creates opportunities for transactions at real point-of-purchase locations, allowing for better sample selection conditions.154 Second, the
procedure imposes a buying obligation on the consumer, removing a
hypothetical bias that can come with research techniques where a participant need not pull out her purse.155 Third, the BDM procedure
avoids an anchoring bias by never stating a reference price and by
keeping the random price distribution secret.156 Finally, studies present evidence that the BDM procedure is easier to administer and less
confusing for participants than other WTP research methods.157
So far, the BDM method has only been used on consumable products and simple consumer durables, and it is unknown whether the
domain of applicability will extend to more complex contracting situations.158 It may be hard, for example, to envision a BDM study that
tests WTP for oil refinery construction or complex derivatives. In theory, there is no reason why the BDM procedure could not be applied to
more sophisticated markets, thus providing an empirical basis for esof $25 from the urn, then she has no opportunity to buy the product and the exercise is
concluded. Becker, DeGroot & Marschak, supra note 145, at 228-29; Wertenbroch &
Skiera, supra note 22, at 230.
152. See Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 230.
153. See John H. Kagel, Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 501 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995);
Vickrey, supra note 145.
154. See Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 230.
155. Id. at 230-31; see also Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42
VAND. L. REV. 269, 315-20 (1989) (discussing some of the biases due to the hypothetical nature of contingent valuation); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Note, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879,
921-29 (1994) (discussing the economic criticisms of contingent valuation biases); Note, “Ask a
Silly Question . . . ”: Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1981, 1982 (1992) (“CV measurements of nonuse values are so speculative that the costs of
using CV to assess damages to natural resources almost always outweigh the benefits.”).
156. Indeed, it is critical not to disclose the probability distribution of random prices to
participants to avoid anchoring effects. See Peter Bohm et al., Eliciting Reservation Prices:
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechanisms vs. Markets, 107 ECON. J. 1079, 1088-89 (1997); see
also sources cited supra note 150. Of course, the participant’s WTP may be influenced by
existing market price benchmarks, especially for less complicated products.
157. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 231-32.
158. Id. at 234.
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timating buyer valuation more broadly.159 But, for now, extended application of the BDM procedure is untested.160 The data that are available, however, can be used to estimate buyer valuation distributions in
simple consumer markets.
2. Fitting the Data to a Probability Distribution
Table 8 calculates summary statistics for the three markets studied by Wertenbroch and Skiera, and Figure 7 graphically displays
the valuation distribution for pens.161 The pen data skews heavily to
159. Conducting these experiments might require some additional steps. For example,
researchers would need to select a meaningful sample, provide detailed product information, and establish credit mechanisms to avoid liquidity constraints. Similarly, spot credit
mechanisms could conceivably open more complex markets to empirical testing. See id.
160. There may be other concerns, not necessarily with the BDM method itself, but with the
use of experimental data more generally. All field-based methods for estimating WTP might be
subject to strategic misrepresentation by participants. See id. at 234-36. For example, if participants believe that a study is being used to explore a price increase, then they may falsely underreport WTP in order to strategically keep prices low. See id. at 234 (noting that a subject’s response may not be accurate if his “normative response goals extend beyond the immediate survey context”). A second form of strategic misrepresentation, the escalation of commitment, relates to behavioral economics. See id. A participant may overstate her WTP because having
agreed to participate in the study, she does not want to walk away empty-handed. Id. Wertenbroch and Skiera test for this by giving one group of participants a reward for participating in
the study, regardless of the ultimate purchase outcome. Id. at 234-35. They find that the two
groups—the reward group and the non-reward group—do not differ statistically in their valuation of the product, arguing against a significant escalation of commitment bias in the BDM
context. Id. at 235-36. A third strategic problem may occur if a participant bids more than her
WTP in order to secure an option to buy but walks away without buying if the random price P is
too high. See id. at 234; see also Jeff T. Casey & Philippe Delquié, Stated vs Implicit Willingness
to Pay Under Risk, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 123, 134, 136
(1995) (discussing the effect of a subject’s belief that his payment or loss may never be enforced).
This is why it is critical that participants in an experiment follow through with buying obligations. See Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Using Laboratory Experimental Auctions in Marketing Research: A Case Study of New Packaging for Fresh Beef, 12 MARKETING SCI. 318, 328 (1993).
Studies thus far suggest that this effect is minimal: just 4 out of 81 buyers refused to purchase
in the Wertenbroch study, Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 234, and just 2 out of 765
buyers refused to purchase in the Hoffman study, Hoffman et al., supra, at 328. Fourth, some
studies suggest that just placing extra attention on a product causes participants to systematically overstate their WTP and that by trying to measure WTP distributions, researchers might
affect the results. See Ziv Carmon & Itamar Simonson, Price-Quality Trade-Offs in Choice Versus Matching: New Insights into the Prominence Effect, 7 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 323 (1998);
Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 234. Finally, broader issues of bounded rationality may
surface. Compare Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (exploring behavioral inconsistencies between
WTP and Willingness to Accept (WTA) for identical products), with W. Michael Hanemann,
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
635 (1991) (suggesting that differences between WTP and WTA can be consistent with economic
theory). On the differences between WTP and WTA and the implications of these differences for
economic analysis of the law, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay
vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993).
161. For the methods, results, and discussion of the studies of these markets, see
Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 231-37. A convenience sample of university students was used for the pen experiment, possibly limiting inferences from this data to a
greater population. Id. at 235. Random sampling was used in the Coca-Cola and cake ex-
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the right—there are many low-value buyers and just a few highvalue buyers (one generous soul offers $16).
TABLE 8
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VALUATION DATA
N

MINIMUM
VALUE

MAXIMUM
VALUE

MEAN

STD.

SKEW-

SE SKEW-

NESS

NESS

PENS*

165

0.00

16.00

1.38

COCACOLA**

1.57

5.58

0.19

100

0.00

3.00

1.07

0.65

0.22

0.24

CAKE**

100

0.00

2.50

1.12

0.56

-0.29

0.24

* value in U.S. $
** value in DM (DM 1.00 is approximately U.S. $0.55)

FIGURE 7
BUYER VALUATION DISTRIBUTION FOR PENS (N = 165)

This sample data provides a basis for estimating the overall distribution of values in the ergonomic pen market, at least for the
population covered in the study. Statistical goodness-of-fit tests, such
periments. Id. at 231. For additional details on the study methodology, see id. at 231-37.
For details on the face validity, internal validity, and criterion validity of this experiment,
see id. at 234-35. While the authors divided the 165 pen participants undergoing the BDM
procedure into two different treatment groups, they reported no statistical difference in the
WTP of both groups, so the data are combined in this Article. Id. at 235-36. Data from participants offering contingent-valuation estimates of their WTP for pens are excluded.
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as the Chi-Square test, measure how well the data fits a number of
common probability distributions.162 For the pen data, a lognormal
distribution offers the tightest fit163 and will be used to select the
random VALUE variable for each buyer in the pen market simulation.164

162. The Chi-Square test breaks down the known distributions into areas of equal
probability and compares the sample data points within each area to the number of expected data points. See DEREK ROWNTREE, STATISTICS WITHOUT TEARS: A PRIMER FOR
NON-MATHEMATICIANS 150-54 (1981). Similarly, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test essentially
calculates the largest vertical distance between the two cumulative distributions. On the
calculation and uses of this test, see Jean Dickinson Gibbons, Kolmogorov-Smirnov Symmetry Test, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL SCIENCES 396 (Samuel Kotz et al. eds.,
1982); and M.A. Stephens, Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Type Tests of Fit, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
STATISTICAL SCIENCES, supra, at 398. For an adaptation of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test,
see Donald W.K. Andrews, A Conditional Kolmogorov Test, 65 ECONOMETRICA 1097 (1997).
The Anderson-Darling test is similar, but it weighs the differences between the two distributions at their tails greater than at their mid-ranges. On the calculation and uses of this
test, see M.A. Stephens, Anderson-Darling Test of Goodness of Fit, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
STATISTICAL SCIENCES, supra, at 81, 81-85.
163. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the pen valuation data are as follows:
CHI-SQUARE
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV
TEST
TEST
Lognormal*
70.55
0.11
Exponential
83.45
0.15
Extreme Value
84.18
0.13
Logistic
105.09
0.14
Weibull
102.73
0.20
Beta
103.45
0.022
Gamma
113.64
0.18
Normal
118.18
0.21
Uniform
771.80
0.75
* Mean = 1.73; standard deviation = 2.42
DISTRIBUTION

ANDERSON-DARLING
TEST
16.23
12.10
1.61
3.76
8.19
15.70
5.86
11.62
218.47

The lognormal distribution is commonly used to model situations where values are positively skewed—such as securities or real estate valuation. The natural logarithm of the
variable yields a normal distribution. This means that the variable can increase without
limits but cannot fall below zero. Most of the values are near the lower limit. While the
lognormal distribution offers the best fit for this data, the goodness-of-fit tests do not have
a high level of statistical significance. The main point of this example, though, is not to argue that this specific data fits the lognormal distribution with a high level of confidence
but rather to ground the distribution of buyer valuations in empirical data. Another approach is to build a custom probability distribution reflecting the exact experimental results. The results of this Article hold when this approach is taken. In fact, rerunning the
analysis with a custom probability distribution substituted for the lognormal distribution
causes the Hadley default to outperform the full-damages default even more frequently
than 90%. The qualifications discussed infra Part III.D also hold with a custom probability
distribution, although the percentage of results where a full-damages default generates
more welfare changes slightly.
164. The specific distribution parameters (mean 1.73; standard deviation 2.42) are calculated with raw data from the Wertenbroch and Skiera study. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 231-37.
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FIGURE 8A

FIGURE 8B

BUYER VALUATION
DISTRIBUTION FOR COCA-COLA (N = 100)

BUYER VALUATION
DISTRIBUTION FOR CAKE (N = 100)

The analysis can be replicated for the other markets. Figure 8a
reveals that the distribution of buyer WTP for a can of Coca-Cola
looks quite different than the valuation distribution for ergonomic
pens. Statistical tests confirm that buyer valuation for Coca-Cola
is better modeled with a logistic probability distribution.165

165. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the Coca-Cola valuation data are as follows:
CHI-SQUARE
TEST
Logistic*
47.8
Beta
48.1
Weibull
51.7
Normal
55.5
Gamma
55.0
Triangular
59.4
Lognormal
63.0
Exponential
73.0
Uniform
115.0
* Mean = 1.06; scale = 0.37
DISTRIBUTION

KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV
TEST
0.10
0.16
0.14
0.11
0.11
0.16
0.19
0.25
0.32

ANDERSON-DARLING
TEST
1.19
24.32
4.25
1.35
1.52
7.12
28.45
30.18
16.43

A logistic distribution with a mean of 1.06 and a scale of 0.37 will be used in the simulation. The logistic distribution is commonly used to describe growth—for example, the size
of a population over time. For the purposes of this Article, the logistic distribution is truncated at zero to avoid negative valuations, and the negative tail is reallocated proportionally to the positive values.
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Finally, the pound cake data are graphed in Figure 8b. The evidence supports a probability distribution similar to the one selected
for the Coca-Cola data.166
3. An Aside: Testing the Majoritarian Solution to Hadley
As a brief aside, if the majoritarian solution to Hadley was sufficiently robust, it would be straightforward to use this data to empirically determine the optimal default rule for any given market. Lawmakers could conduct an experiment to solicit WTP data from a random sample of buyers in the market. They would then make inferences about the distribution of valuations for the broader contracting
population. This might advocate a majoritarian, and thus most efficient, default rule.
For example, suppose a lawmaker faces a sample of 100 buyers
with performance valuations distributed as in Figure 1a.167 The lawmaker could immediately observe that 65% of the buyers in this
sample have valuations below the mean.168 This suggests that the
Hadley rule, appropriate with many low-value buyers, looks promising. Using inferential statistics, the lawmaker might then generalize
from the sample to the relevant population by testing the following
hypotheses:
H0: Buyer valuations for the population are not skewed positively
(µ3 ≤ 0)
Ha: Buyer valuations for the population are skewed positively
(µ3 > 0)

166. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the cake valuation data are as follows:
CHI-SQUARE
TEST
Logistic*
25.3
Triangular
25.3
Beta
26.2
Normal
35.1
Gamma
34.1
Weibull
34.2
Uniform
50.7
Lognormal
51.4
Exponential
124.9
* Mean = 1.14; scale = 0.32
DISTRIBUTION

KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV
TEST
0.08
0.11
0.16
0.11
0.13
0.13
0.21
0.14
0.30

ANDERSON-DARLING
TEST
0.84
2.43
13.04
1.08
1.66
2.36
7.19
15.42
22.50

A logistic distribution with a mean of 1.14 and a scale of 0.32 will be used in the simulation. As with the Coca-Cola distribution, the probability is adjusted slightly to avoid negative values.
167. See supra p. 899 fig.1a. Figure 1a is identical to the table of value distributions
presented supra note 51.
168. Specifically, the first 65 buyers have a valuation less than the mean of 5.1.
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The statistic for skewness, µ3, measures the degree of asymmetry
of a distribution around its mean.169 Positive skewness indicates a
distribution with a right-sided tail; negative skewness indicates the
opposite.170 In this example, the lawmaker could reject the null hypothesis at the 99% confidence level:
µ3 = 1.086 ± (2.58) * (the standard error)
µ3 = 1.086 ± (2.58) * (0.241)
µ3 = 0.464 to 1.708
Therefore, reject H0 at the 99% confidence level because µ3 does
not appear to be less than zero.
Such an inference supports the Hadley rule as the superior default. The sample of 100 buyers yields a highly confident inference
that buyer valuations for the entire population are not skewed to the
left.171 A lawmaker subscribing to the majoritarian solution should
reject the full-damages default rule and impose a Hadley default rule
to lower transaction costs and increase social welfare.
This same analysis would advocate the Hadley rule in the market
for pens. The skewness statistic is so large that the null hypothesis
can be rejected with great confidence.172 The data for Coca-Cola and
cake, however, do not conclusively point to a majoritarian default;
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in both cases.173
But, as discussed earlier, the majoritarian solution does not fully
capture the intricacies of contracting under asymmetric information.174 The next task is to combine information on buyer valuation
distributions with other variables in the Hadley model.

169. More specifically, skewness is based on the relationship between the mean and
the mode: greater distances between the mean and mode lead to a higher value for the
skewness statistic. ROWNTREE, supra note 162, at 61.
170. Id. at 59.
171. This is true because the inferred skewness for the population is greater than zero,
rejecting a left-skewed population at the 99% confidence level.
172. Taking the statistics from Table 8, supra p. 931:
µ3 = 5.58 ± (2.58) * (0.19)
µ3 = 5.09 to 6.07
Therefore, reject H0 at the 99% confidence level.
173. Again, using the statistics calculated in Table 8, supra p. 931. For Coca-Cola:
µ3 = 0.22 ± (2.58) * (0.24)
µ3 = -0.40 to 0.84
Therefore, do not reject H0 at the 99% confidence level.
For cake:
µ3 = -0.29 ± (2.58) * (0.24)
µ3 = -0.91 to 0.33
Therefore, do not reject H0 at the 99% confidence level.
174. See supra Part II.B.2.
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C. Selecting the Better Default Rule
In the 1940s, Stanislaw Ulam, a Polish mathematician working
with John von Neumann on the Manhattan Project, wanted to estimate his chances of winning a game of fifty-two card solitaire.175 To
solve the problem, he programmed a computer to play out the card
game continually and track the results.176 Ulam’s musings at Los
Alamos led to the modern analytical technique of Monte Carlo simulation, which uses statistical computer sampling to approximate solutions to quantitative problems.177 Random values are repeatedly
generated to model the impact of uncertain variables on a range of
outcomes. Monte Carlo simulation, deriving its name from similarities to the games of chance played in Monaco, has been used extensively to model decisionmaking under uncertainty in physics, engineering, business, and mathematics.178 There is also precedent for
running Monte Carlo techniques in legal scholarship.179
Using Monte Carlo simulation, this Part finds that a Hadley default rule typically outperforms a full-damages default rule in three
simple markets. The distribution of buyer valuations for each market
is grounded in empirical research from the Wertenbroch and Skiera
studies.180 But to conduct the simulation, assumptions must be made
for other variables in the Hadley model.181
Table 9 displays a list of initial assumptions, chosen to reflect a
reasonable contracting system (each assumption is relaxed later to
conduct sensitivity analysis).182 Note that three variables—the probability of incurring consequential damages, transaction costs, and the
separation threshold—do not differ initially between low- and highvalue buyers. The impact of different assumptions by buyer type for
these variables is considered shortly.183
175. See Eckhardt, supra note 23, at 131-36.
176. Id.; Nicholas Metropolis, The Beginning of the Monte Carlo Method, 15 LOS
ALAMOS SCI. 125 (1987).
177. See Eckhardt, supra note 23, at 131; see also RUSSELL DAVIDSON & JAMES G.
MACKINNON, ECONOMETRIC THEORY AND METHODS 157 (2004); GENTLE, supra note 23;
JÄCKEL, supra note 23; MANNO, supra note 23.
178. MANNO, supra note 23, at 9.
179. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 229-31 (2002) (using Monte Carlo simulation to test a
campaign finance secrecy algorithm); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial
Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 660
(1999). On the related concept of using agent-based computer simulation to inform legal
doctrine, see Randal C. Picker, Simlaw 2011, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019.
180. See supra Part III.B.
181. Additional experiments that simultaneously estimate these other variables might
yield more robust results. See infra Part IV.
182. For example, the precaution variables are chosen such that low precautions cost
less and are less effective than medium precautions, so the average-value buyer prefers
medium precautions.
183. See infra Part III.D.
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TABLE 9
KEY ASSUMPTIONS IN THE HADLEY SIMULATION MODEL
VARIABLE

ASSUMPTION

1. Buyer valuation (VALUE)

Market specific

2. General damages (GD)

$0.20184

3. Probability of consequential damages (PROBCD)
4. Success with low precautions (PROBLOW)
5. Cost of low precautions (COSTLOW)
6. Success with medium precautions (PROBMED)
7. Cost of medium precautions (COSTMED)
8. Success with high precautions (PROBHIGH)
9. Cost of high precautions (COSTHIGH)
10. Transaction costs for low-value buyers (TCLOW)
11. Transaction costs for high-value buyers (TCHIGH)
12. Separation threshold for low-value buyers (SEPLOW)
13. Separation threshold for high-value buyers (SEPHIGH)

N (90%, 5%)185
50%
$0.20
70%
$0.40
90%
$0.75
$.05
$.05
20%
20%

With these assumptions, the welfare benefits of a Hadley default
versus a full-damages default can be played out many times. Each
trial generates a new set of performance valuations for the 100 buyers. The model then determines how many low-value buyers reveal
their type under a full-damages default and how many high-value
buyers reveal their type under a Hadley default. If enough buyers reveal their type, the population separates and nonidentifying buyers
receive tailored precautions under the default rule. Ultimately, the
model calculates total social welfare under both default rules—
according to the algorithms of Figures 4 and 5186—and compares the
results.
1. Pens
For example, a single iteration for the pen market might yield the
outcome shown in Table 10. In this instance, the most generous
buyer values the pen at $9.76 and the minimum buyer values the
pen at $0.08. The total social welfare under each default rule is quite
close, but the Hadley default does slightly better.

184. All damages are assumed to be general damages if a buyer’s total valuation is less
than $0.20.
185. This variable is randomly selected from a normal distribution with a mean of 90%
and a standard deviation of 5%.
186. See supra p. 924 fig.4; p. 925 fig.5.
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TABLE 10
RESULTS OF ONE ITERATION OF THE HADLEY SIMULATION MODEL
(PENS)
RESULT
1. Total number of buyers
2. Buyers choosing to contract
3. Number of low-value buyers
4. Number of medium-value buyers
5. Number of high-value buyers
6. Lowest buyer
7. Highest buyer
8. Buyers identifying their type under full damages
9. Buyers identifying their type under Hadley
10. Social welfare under full damages
11. Social welfare under Hadley
12. Net benefit from Hadley default rule

100
82
36
22
24
$0.08
$9.76
23%
24%
68.5
70.8
2.3

Better default rule

Hadley

Of course, the results of one trial are not very meaningful. After
saving this data, the simulation next generates a different sample of
100 random buyer valuations and reevaluates the superior default
rule. The process is repeated hundreds or thousands of times to arrive at a range of outcomes indicating the likely efficiency benefits of
one default rule over another. Monte Carlo simulation thus allows
lawmakers to live in a thousand or more parallel universes, where
they can compare the effects of both default rules.187
A run of 10,000 trials for the pen market—under the assumptions
of Table 9188—generates the results displayed in Figure 9, infra. This
figure graphs the net efficiency benefit of a Hadley default rule, and
a social welfare number greater than zero indicates that Hadley outperforms a full-damages default. In this simulation, almost 90% of
the results are positive, suggesting that the Hadley rule leads to a
more efficient outcome much of the time. The expected value, or average overall efficiency benefit of the Hadley rule, is 4.8.
The distribution of the results is also important. The minimum
result is negative 3.2, the maximum is 29.7, and the positive area
under the curve exceeds the negative area. In other words, the upside from choosing a Hadley default far outweighs the potential
downside. Note two clusters of data. There is a break point around
3.5—about half of the trials are less than this value, while the other
half exceed it. The lower set of results occurs when the full-damages
default leads to a separating equilibrium. Hadley often does slightly
187. See GENTLE, supra note 23; JÄCKEL, supra note 23; MANNO, supra note 23.
188. See supra p. 937 tbl.9.
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better in these cases, but the range of outcomes is tight, and the default rule may not matter much.
FIGURE 9
NET BENEFIT OF HADLEY RULE OVER FULL-DAMAGES RULE—PENS
(N = 10,000 TRIALS)

When the full-damages default leads to a pooling equilibrium, however, the benefits from choosing the Hadley rule can be quite large. Extremely high-value buyers, who get greater social welfare with high precautions, drive much of this difference. They receive medium precautions under a pooling full-damages equilibrium. But if the Hadley rule
causes separation, these high-value buyers get high precautions. And
even when Hadley pools, the highest-value buyers often contract around
the default individually. This follows classic penalty-default theory,189
and the level of precautions received by extreme-value buyers in the pen
market has a major impact on the relative efficiency of the two defaults.
The analysis is quite complicated, though, and Hadley causes at
least three other effects. First, there is another group of high-value
buyers who end up with less efficient contracts under Hadley. These
buyers derive almost as much utility under medium precautions, and
they choose not to incur the transaction costs (and sometimes the information costs) of contracting around a Hadley default. But when
the buyer pool separates, these buyers end up being mistaken for
low-value buyers and they receive inefficiently low precautions. Second, medium-value buyers can also do worse with this default. They

189. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 91, 108-18; Craswell, supra note 33, at 5-10.
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receive low precautions under Hadley instead of the medium precautions that they prefer, and get, with a full-damages pooling equilibrium. Finally, most low-value buyers come out better under a Hadley
separating equilibrium: they receive their preferred precautions
without needing to incur transaction costs. The Hadley rule can thus
cause many different effects, some of which may be unintentional.
2. Coca-Cola and Cake
Figures 10 and 11, infra, present the Monte Carlo simulation results in the markets for Coca-Cola and pound cake. The default rules
in these two markets behave similarly, and both markets can be analyzed together. Hadley still generates more welfare than full damages—89% of the time with Coca-Cola and 83% of the time with cake.
The expected value in both markets remains positive, but there are
different reasons for Hadley’s superiority in these two markets.
FIGURE 10
NET BENEFIT OF HADLEY RULE OVER FULL-DAMAGES RULE—COKE
(N = 10,000 TRIALS)

The most important difference is that there are fewer high-value
buyers. This means that the Hadley rule almost never leads to a
separating equilibrium because there are not enough high-value
buyers to signal their type. It also means that, unlike the pen study,
extremely high-value buyers are very rare and do not have much impact on the choice of default rule.
As before, the results divide into two clusters. In the Coca-Cola
market, for example, about 40% of the trials result in a net Hadley
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benefit under 2.0; the other 60% exceeds 2.0. The lower set of values
occurs when both default rules cause a pooling equilibrium. The choice
of default rule here is a close call, based on many small effects. The
Hadley rule generally does better, but not by much.
By contrast, Hadley outperforms full damages by a significant margin in the second data cluster. These results occur when the fulldamages default leads to separation, while buyers in the Hadley default continue to pool. This is a counterintuitive result: How could a
Hadley rule leading to pooling—and thus fewer tailored precautions—
outperform a full-damages rule leading to separation?190
The explanation is subtle. There is a group of low-value buyers who
gain almost as much utility contracting under medium precautions as
they do from contracting under low precautions. With a full-damages
default, the benefit to these buyers of moving to low precautions does
not exceed the transaction costs and they do not reveal their type. However, there is another group that contains enough low-value buyers who
benefit from low precautions (or from information disclosure benefits)
that under a full-damages default, the buyer pool separates. This means
that under a full-damages default, the first group of low-value buyers
now receives high precautions, which are much less efficient. Under the
Hadley default, these low-value buyers continue to receive medium precautions, which results in a net gain to social welfare.
FIGURE 11
NET BENEFIT OF HADLEY RULE OVER FULL-DAMAGES RULE—CAKE
(N = 10,000 TRIALS)

190. Contra Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 108-18.
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More generally, if transaction costs prevent some low-value buyers from revealing their type, but the buyer pool still separates under
a full-damages default, there is a social welfare loss as these lowvalue buyers receive excess precautions. The seller mistakenly concludes that they are high-value types.
In these simulations, then, the Hadley default rule outperforms a
full-damages default nearly 90% of the time in all three markets.
This happens largely for two different reasons. In the market for
pens, extreme-value buyers do not always receive high precautions
with a full-damages default, but they will contract for these efficient
precautions with Hadley. This is an empirical example of the classic
penalty-default theory.191 In the markets for Coca-Cola and cake, the
Hadley default does better, not because of the effects of extremevalue buyers (there are fewer of these), but rather because low-value
buyers who do not contract around a full-damages default rule sometimes receive inefficiently high precautions by mistake.
D. Qualifying the Findings
The analysis thus far might be criticized for relying too heavily on
assumption-based modeling. While the distribution of buyer valuations is grounded in empirical data, the other variables in the Hadley
model take on assumptions. This Part uses sensitivity analysis to
address this concern, and it finds that the merits of the Hadley default rule must indeed be qualified. In fact, there are lessons to be
learned through a detailed examination of the various situations
where Hadley may generate less social welfare.
Specifically, in the markets studied, the Hadley rule does not outperform a full-damages default in four important circumstances. First,
Hadley is not preferable when high-value buyers systematically have a
much greater chance of incurring consequential damages. Second, a
full-damages default outperforms Hadley when most of the efficiency
gains from information revelation go to low-value buyers. Third, the
Hadley rule is often worse when the transaction costs of contracting
around a default rule are much greater for high-value buyers than for
low-value buyers. Finally, the analysis assumes perfect competition,
and introducing seller power into the empirical models might change
the results.
Take the last qualification first. Jason Scott Johnston has developed a game theoretical model of the Hadley rule, where he relaxes assumptions of perfectly competitive markets.192 In other words, sellers

191. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 91, 108-18; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note
5; Craswell, supra note 33, at 5-9.
192. See Johnston, supra note 7.
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are no longer “identical price-taking firms.”193 This introduces several
new complexities. For instance, sellers now have an incentive to learn
about buyer valuations, not in order to take efficient precautions, but
rather to increase their individual profits through price discrimination.194 It also adds another dimension of information revelation: buyers seek to learn whether different sellers have different probabilities
of breach.195 Rerunning the empirical analysis with a model that incorporates these effects might lead to new conclusions.196
The balance of this Part addresses the other qualifications in turn,
illustrating them with results from the ergonomic pen study.197 It
also considers the important role played by the separation variable.
1. High-Value Buyers Suffer Consequential Damages More
Frequently
Barry Adler’s work on the Hadley doctrine suggests that it may
not result in an efficient outcome when consequential damages are
modeled stochastically.198 This Part provides empirical support for
this finding, while also exploring the boundary conditions necessary
for Hadley to succeed. Recall that the earlier analysis assumes that a
buyer’s chance of incurring consequential damages (PROBCD) is
taken from a normal probability distribution with a mean of 90% and
a standard deviation of 5%.199 This assumption is used for every
buyer.
The Hadley rule becomes inferior when two changes are made to
this assumption. First, there must be a very wide difference in the
probability of incurring consequential damages. This is illustrated
by changing the parameters of PROBCD to a mean of 70% and a
standard deviation of 15%, which means that most buyers face a
probability of incurring consequential damages ranging from 40% to
100%. Second, the probability of incurring consequential damages
must be correlated with buyer valuation. In other words, high-value
buyers are more likely to incur consequential damages than lowvalue buyers (a correlation coefficient of 0.8 is used in this analy-

193. Id. at 625.
194. Id. at 625-26.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 626; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 736-37; Schwartz, supra note
112, at 397-99. This Article, while acknowledging these complications, leaves empirical
analysis of models with seller market power for another day. It is worth noting, however,
that even in these models, the distribution of buyer valuations is an important variable
and insights from empirical simulation models might convey useful information.
197. Unless noted otherwise, the qualifications also hold true for the Coca-Cola and
pound cake data.
198. See supra Part II.B.3.
199. See supra note 134.
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sis). With these changes, a full-damages default is usually more efficient than Hadley, as illustrated in Figure 12.
FIGURE 12
HIGH BUYERS FACE GREATER PROBABILITY OF CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES (N = 10,000 TRIALS)

This change is explained largely by high-value buyer behavior.
Facing much greater information costs, high-value buyers rarely reveal their type under a Hadley default. At the same time, low-value
buyers, with cheaper information costs, separate even more frequently under a full-damages rule. When this happens, high-value
buyers get efficient high precautions, and the benefits of a fulldamages rule are large.200 If both rules result in a pooling equilibrium, Hadley is often slightly better.

200. This exception rarely holds in the markets for Coca-Cola and cake. There are
fewer high-value buyers and the benefits of tailored precautions under a full-damages rule
is much diminished. Hadley usually remains the superior default rule.
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TABLE 11
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE ASSUMPTIONS—SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
PROBCD
MEAN (%)

PROBCD
STANDARD
DEVIATION
(%)

CORRELATION
BETWEEN
PROBCD AND
VALUE

PERCENT OF
RESULTS WHERE
HADLEY IS
SUPERIOR
(N = 500 TRIALS)

low deviation,
no correlation

70

5

0

92.6

low deviation,
high correlation

70

5

0.8

78.6

high deviation,
no correlation

70

15

0

59

high deviation,
high correlation

70

15

0.8

13.8

SCENARIO

The optimal default rule changes only if both adjustments to
PROBCD take place. With a tight standard deviation, the information cost effects are too small to matter. And if PROBCD and VALUE
are uncorrelated, then Hadley remains the better default.201 Table 11
illustrates this point. As Adler’s theoretical model suggests, stochastic consequential damages can affect the optimal default202—but only
when the probability of incurring damages deviates greatly and is
tied disproportionately to high-value buyers.
2. Low-Value Buyers “Take Most of the Benefits” from Tailored
Precautions
Each seller precaution level might be viewed as a discrete tradeoff along two dimensions: cost and effectiveness (modeled in this case
as the probability of successfully completing performance). Decreasing the cost or increasing the effectiveness of any one precaution
level will make it more attractive relative to the other precaution
choices. But making a precaution level especially attractive does not
necessarily change the optimal default rule. Very cheap low precautions or very expensive high precautions may still result in an economic system where Hadley generates more welfare.203
Different precaution assumptions can, however, cause a fulldamages default to become more efficient than Hadley. The key con201. With a wide deviation in PROBCD, the effects are magnified: very low levels of
correlation between the two variables can cause a full-damages default to outperform Hadley.
202. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1551-52, 1560-61.
203. For example, reducing the cost of low precautions in the pen market from $0.20 to
$0.05 causes Hadley to still perform better nearly 60% of the time. If the cost of low precautions continues to be lowered, however, the full-damages default rule will typically become more efficient due to the effects described in this Part.
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cern is the differentiation between low, high, and medium precautions on the cost-effectiveness spectrum. Specifically, a full-damages
default can become optimal when low precautions are positioned very
far away from medium precautions or when high precautions are positioned very close to medium precautions. In a sense, these changes
allow low-value buyers to “take most of the benefits” from tailored
precautions. High-value buyers may as well stick with medium precautions.
In the initial analysis, the cost-effectiveness positions of low, medium, and high precautions are evenly spaced.204 This means that
high- and low-value buyers each benefit similarly by moving to tailored precautions. Figure 13 portrays four ways to adjust evenly
spaced precautions. Low precautions become more differentiated (or
sharper) relative to medium precautions by reducing COSTLOW and
PROBLOW. Conversely, low precautions become less differentiated
(or duller) by raising COSTLOW and PROBLOW. High precautions
follow a similar pattern.
FIGURE 13
ADJUSTMENTS TO SELLER PRECAUTIONS

Table 12, infra, shows the results of the Monte Carlo simulation
with different precaution scenarios. Sharper high precautions or
duller low precautions cause Hadley to outperform the full-damages
default almost 100% of the time. But dulling high precautions drops
the effectiveness of Hadley to 75%. The full-damages default usually
generates more welfare than Hadley when low precautions are very
sharp. And it outperforms Hadley over 97% of the time when low
precautions are sharpened and high precautions are dulled at the
same time.

204. One slight exception: the cost of moving from low to medium precautions ($0.20
to $0.40) is a bit cheaper than the cost of moving from medium to high precautions
($0.40 to $0.75), reflecting diminishing marginal returns to the precaution investment.
See supra p. 937 tbl.9.
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TABLE 12
PRECAUTIONS SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
COSTLOW
($)

PROBLOW
(%)

COSTHIGH
($)

PROBHIGH
(%)

PERCENT OF RESULTS
WHERE HADLEY IS SUPERIOR

(N = 500 TRIALS)

0.20

50

0.75

90

90.0

0.05

35

0.75

90

29.2

0.30

65

0.75

90

99.8

0.20

50

0.60

80

75.2

0.20

50

0.90

95

99.2

0.05

35

0.60

80

2.8

Sharpening low precautions causes several effects. First, cheaper
prices entice null buyers to enter the market, resulting in many more
low-value buyers. These buyers usually reveal their type, and a separating equilibrium typically occurs under a full-damages rule. If
Hadley pools, these low-value buyers do worse with medium precautions. And Hadley is often less efficient when it leads to a separating
equilibrium as well. Medium buyers are much worse off with the
sharper low precautions, which they receive in a Hadley separation,
than with the high precautions that they receive under a fulldamages default.
The analysis is reversed when high precautions are dulled. Highvalue buyers have less cause to reveal their type, and the Hadley default pools more often. Even when Hadley separates, high-value buyers that keep quiet receive inefficient low precautions. These buyers
are better off under full damages, receiving either medium precautions (with pooling) or high precautions (with separation).
Simultaneously sharpening low precautions and dulling high precautions magnifies both effects.
3. High-Value Buyers Incur Much Greater Transaction Costs
The optimal default rule can also change when transaction costs
incurred by high-value buyers are much greater than those incurred
by low-value buyers. There are two interesting scenarios—either of
which prevents Hadley from performing better than full damages.
First, the transaction costs for low-value buyers might be so cheap
that they can easily contract around inefficient defaults. Second, the
transaction costs for high-value buyers might be very expensive,205
hindering them from contracting around inefficient defaults. The two
205. This might be true, for instance, if it becomes quite complicated to make special
arrangements to protect against high levels of consequential damages.

948

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:897

scenarios are related and cause similar effects, but they do so
through different means.
For instance, when TCLOW is reduced to $0.01, Hadley outperforms the full-damages default rule only 12% of the time, as illustrated in Table 13. Because low-value buyer transaction costs are so
cheap, the full-damages rule always leads to a separating equilibrium. Most of the time the Hadley rule also results in separation, but
high-value buyers with a high probability of incurring consequential
damages will not reveal their type. Under Hadley, they are treated
as low-value buyers and get inefficiently low precautions. Under a
full-damages rule, they are treated as high-value buyers and get efficient precautions.206
TABLE 13
TRANSACTION COST SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
TCLOW ($)

TCHIGH ($)

PERCENT OF RESULTS WHERE
HADLEY IS SUPERIOR
(N = 500 TRIALS)

0.05
0.01
5.00
0.05
0.05

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.01
5.00

91
12
100
100
7

When TCHIGH is increased to relatively high levels, it becomes
too expensive for high-value buyers to separate, and the Hadley rule
results in a pooling equilibrium. When the full-damages rule leads to
separation, it is the more efficient outcome because high-value buyers receive efficient precautions that they do not get under Hadley.
Full-damages usually fares better in a pooling equilibrium, as well,
although very rarely the Hadley rule results in greater total welfare.
An extremely high-value buyer may benefit so much from high precautions that he or she incurs the high transaction costs and still
comes out ahead. As TCHIGH approaches infinity, however, this no
longer occurs and the full-damages default is always better.
4. The Impact of the Separation Variable
Recall that the separation variable indicates the minimum number of buyers required to identify their type before silent buyers receive tailored precautions.207 For example, if more than 20% of buyers

206. Again, this qualification is not necessary in the markets for Coca-Cola and cake
for the reason described supra note 200.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
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identify their type as high in a Hadley regime, sellers will give all
other buyers low precautions. This concept receives little discussion
in the contracts literature because most models assume identical
valuations for low-value and high-value buyer classes.208 In this
simulation model, however, valuations vary within each group. This
means that buyer identification is not an all or nothing affair—the
model needs to manage an intermediate level of separation.
Changing the separation variable by itself has little effect on the
results in Part III.C. The Hadley rule continues to outperform a fulldamages default even when low-value buyers always separate
(SEPLOW equals 0%) and high-value buyers always pool (SEPHIGH
equals 101%).209 But adjusting the separation variable will sometimes mute or magnify the qualifications discussed in this Part. For
example, doubling the separation variable for low-value buyers to
40% reinstates Hadley as the superior default rule when high-value
buyers have a greater probability of incurring consequential damages.210 The full-damages default now leads to a pooling equilibrium
most of the time, and high-value buyers no longer receive efficient
precautions. Similarly, raising SEPLOW mutes the impact of cheap
transaction costs for low-value buyers.211
The way that sellers treat silent buyers, then, might significantly
affect the optimal consequential-damages default rule. Further research is needed on this topic.212
IV. SUMMARY AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS
This case study offers evidence that the Hadley default rule typically generates more social welfare than a full-damages default rule.
The work implies that markets with similar conditions might also
benefit from the Hadley rule. In markets where there are few highvalue buyers—such as the market for pens—Hadley induces these
208. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 1561-62 & 1561 n.38; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra
note 5, at 292-303. Adler suggests that modeling buyer valuation stochastically might be a
fruitful endeavor. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1561 n.38.
209. This is generally caused by low-value buyers who refuse to identify their type in a
full-damages regime and receive inefficiently high precautions. They derive more utility in
a Hadley regime where they get medium precautions. And recall that extremely high-value
buyers will still contract around the Hadley default rule for efficiently high precautions,
even when it results in a pooling equilibrium.
210. See supra Part III.D.1.
211. For example, rerunning line 2 in Table 13, supra p. 948, (TCLOW = .01; TCHIGH
= .05) with a higher separation variable for low-value buyers (SEPLOW = 35%) leads to a
result where Hadley does better in 54% of the trials.
212. It would be interesting to test empirically whether sellers choose different separation variables based on their underlying knowledge of buyer type. For example, if sellers
realize that only 10% of buyers are high-value types, they might require just 5% to 10% of
all contracting buyers to reveal their type before other buyers receive tailored precautions.
The number of medium-value buyers might also play into this calculus.
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extreme-value buyers to contract for efficiently high precautions. A
full-damages default for the same buyer population will sometimes
lead to a pooling equilibrium instead, and the resulting welfare loss
can be large. In short, this study provides empirical support for the
classic penalty-default literature.213
The Coca-Cola and cake studies suggest that Hadley can also outperform a full-damages default in markets where buyer valuations
are less skewed. This occurs when Hadley leads to a pooling equilibrium and the full-damages default causes separation—a counterintuitive result. The explanation is that some buyers have a slight
preference for low precautions, but not enough to incur the transaction costs of contracting around a full-damages default rule. If
enough other low-value buyers incur these costs, the population
separates and the first group of buyers who prefer low precautions
receives inefficiently high precautions. They are mistaken for highvalue buyers.
For both of these reasons, an efficiency-minded lawmaker selecting a consequential-damages default rule in markets with similar
conditions might be justified in choosing the Hadley limitation. While
Hadley does not always perform better, it is the surer bet.
Under several circumstances, however, Hadley is an inferior
choice. First, if high-value buyers systematically have a much higher
probability of incurring consequential damages, then they are less
likely to contract around the default. An additional cost is imposed as
sellers learn this information. Extreme differences can change the
optimal default rule.
Second, the findings will not hold when low-value buyers take
most of the benefits from tailored precautions—that is, the costeffectiveness trade-off of low precautions is strongly differentiated
from those of medium and high precautions. The treatment of medium-value buyers, in part, drives this change. Medium-value buyers
now do worse under a Hadley default because they receive inefficiently low precautions.
Third, if transaction costs for high-value buyers are very expensive, they will not contract around inefficient defaults. Similar results occur (for different reasons) when transaction costs for lowvalue buyers are very cheap. While selecting a consequentialdamages default rule is a tricky task, fraught with competing effects,214 empirical research can help lawmakers learn more about the
right conditions for either imposing—or shunning—a Hadley default.

213. See sources cited supra notes 5, 7.
214. See, e.g., discussion supra note 112; see also Adler, supra note 7; Ayres & Gertner,
supra note 2; Johnston, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra note 112.
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This case study provides a framework for empirical analysis. But
the work also raises new questions, and additional research would
help along multiple fronts.
First, more complicated markets need to be examined. The techniques used by marketing scholars to measure buyer willingness to
pay, such as the BDM procedure, will conceivably extend into more
complex markets.215 Applying data from these studies might lead to
tighter-fitting buyer valuation distributions. Work on complex markets would also move the research closer to the typical domain of
contract law.
Second, it would be powerful to conduct empirical research that
simultaneously measures multiple variables in the Hadley model.
This Article grounds buyer valuation in empirical research and models the other variables with assumptions and sensitivity analysis.216
Research that extends this work by empirically measuring buyer
valuations, probability estimates for incurring consequential damages, cost and effectiveness of seller precautions, and the transaction
costs needed to choose different precaution levels would yield more
meaningful results.
Third, more work is needed on selecting the optimal level of
granularity for contract default rules.217 Exploring the classic jurisprudential rules-versus-standards tension might be helpful in the
Hadley context.218 Building a greater empirical database on the merits of the Hadley rule versus a full-damages default in other markets
would be a good start. Lawmakers are unlikely to launch primary
WTP research to select a default rule for any given dispute, but additional research might lead to a sharper set of rules—or provide other
guidance—for courts deciding when to award consequential damages
in a specific case.
Finally, scholars need to launch empirical research that incorporates seller market power. Moving empirical Hadley analysis to
game-theoretical models that relax assumptions of perfect competition will yield more robust insights.219
V. USING MARKETING DATA IN CONTRACT LAW SCHOLARSHIP
The Hadley case study illustrates the potential benefits of testing
economic theories of contract law with empirical research. It chal215. See Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 234; see also supra notes 158-60 and
accompanying text.
216. See supra Parts III.C-D.
217. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
218. For some of the commentators that have explored this topic, see Diver, supra note
124; Kaplow, supra note 124; and Katz, supra note 124.
219. For some of the studies that have relaxed these assumptions, see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 746-62; Johnston, supra note 7; and Schwartz, supra note 112.
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lenges the a priori claim that economic contracts scholarship has
reached a dead end.220 But, more generally, the study hints that
marketing research might be a fruitful source of data for contract law
scholars. This Part briefly explores some possible benefits of connecting the two disciplines.
The case for using marketing research in contract law scholarship
is straightforward. Contract theory, on one hand, needs empirical
data to test a variety of claims.221 Marketing scholars, on the other
hand, have conducted vast amounts of empirical research over the
past several decades.222 In some cases, this research may address the
same questions being asked in contract law. Both disciplines, after
all, deal with issues of transactional exchange and consumer preferences.223 Where there is overlap, contract theory might reap immediate benefits by drawing upon this marketing work.
The potential applications of empirical research span most
branches of contract law. On the contract formation side, economic
theory wrestles with offer and acceptance,224 promissory estoppel,225
unconscionability,226 mistake,227 impossibility,228 and other issues.
Contract interpretation raises some of the same questions as Hadley,
specifically: What default rules should be imposed to guide interpretation problems that arise with incomplete or ambiguous con220. For a discussion of this claim, see supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
221. See Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1036-37; Landes, supra note 18, at 170; Weintraub, supra note 18, at 4.
222. See, e.g., DAVID A. AAKER ET AL., MARKETING RESEARCH (7th ed. 2001); Donald T.
Campbell & Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research
on Teaching, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING (N.L. Gage ed., 1963), reprinted in
DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963); PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING DECISION MAKING: A MODEL
BUILDING APPROACH (1971).
223. Compare Schwartz & Scott, supra note 34, at 555-56, and Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1203, 1216-18 (2003) (contracts), with AAKER ET AL., supra note 222, at 627, 665, and Steven M. Shugan, Editorial: Defining Interesting Research Problems, 22 MARKETING SCI. 1,
14 (2003) (marketing).
224. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 481 (1996).
225. See, e.g., Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249 (1996); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1991).
226. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293 (1975); Korobkin, supra note 223; Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977).
227. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1573
(2003); Eric Rasmusen & Ian Ayres, Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 309 (1993).
228. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); Alan O.
Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 43 (1990); George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique
of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450 (1992).
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tracts?229 And scholars draw heavily on economic analysis to study
contract remedy issues ranging from expectation damages230 and specific performance231 to limitations on damage recovery such as mitigation,232 subjective loss,233 and the Hadley rule.234 All of these economic theories might gain from empirical testing.
And across campus, marketing researchers follow a long tradition
of empirical research.235 Over the last several decades, they have pioneered numerous data-driven studies that guide managerial decisionmaking in diverse situations.236 Marketing scholars build dedicated research centers to capture and analyze data.237 These centers
229. See Posner, supra note 11, at 839-42.
230. See SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 343-53; John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of
Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Steven Shavell, Damage
Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980) (refining the circumstances
under which expectation damages are desirable). For a more general economic treatment
of contract remedies, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis
of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1986).
231. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271
(1979); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory
of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984).
232. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 37.
233. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value:
The Relevance of Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1983).
234. See sources cited supra note 7.
235. See, e.g., CAMPBELL & STANLEY, supra note 222; KOTLER, supra note 222; David
H. Ahl, New Product Forecasting Using Consumer Panels, 7 J. MARKETING RES. 160 (1970);
Gerald Albaum & Robert A. Peterson, Empirical Research in International Marketing:
1976-1982, 15 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 161 (1984); N.D. Cadbury, When, Where, and How to Test
Market, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1975, at 96.
236. To illustrate the range of topics addressed by the marketing sciences, consider
Eyal Biyalogorsky et al., Research Note: Overselling with Opportunistic Cancellations, 18
MARKETING SCI. 605 (1999) (offering techniques to improve profitability through pricing);
Randolph E. Bucklin & Catarina Sismeiro, A Model of Web Site Browsing Behavior Estimated on Clickstream Data, 40 J. MARKETING RES. 249 (2003) (examining browsing behavior of 5000 random visitors to the website of an Internet automotive reseller); Ganesh Iyer,
Coordinating Channels Under Price and Nonprice Competition, 17 MARKETING SCI. 338
(1998) (exploring how sellers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete on both price and nonprice terms); Ramya Neelamegham & Pradeep Chintagunta, A
Bayesian Model to Forecast New Product Performance in Domestic and International Markets, 18 MARKETING SCI. 115 (1999) (offering a methodology to forecast the success of new
product launches based on past launches); and Sanjeev Swami et al., SilverScreener: A
Modeling Approach to Movie Screens Management, 18 MARKETING SCI. 352 (1999) (offering
a decision support system in the media industry). The work speaks to many different audiences, including managers, consumers, regulators, investors, litigators, and consultants.
See Shugan, supra note 223, at 8-13 (suggesting fifteen different audiences likely to benefit
from marketing research). Of particular interest is Professor Shugan’s suggestion that
“litigation [is a] fertile area for provocative and important [marketing] research problems.”
Id. at 13. He goes on to discuss, for example, how marketing research can contribute to
damages assessment in private litigation disputes. Id.
237. A few notable marketing research centers include the following: The Alfred West
Jr. Learning Lab at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, at
http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/learning/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2005); Center for Retail
Management at Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, at
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/retail/index.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005);
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research applied business problems with vast data sets and sophisticated analytical techniques.238 This proliferation of empirical research is aided, no doubt, by technological advancements that allow
easier data capture at the point of purchase and comprehensive
analysis at the back end.239 The work yields vast repositories of empirical data.
In some cases, marketing researchers may be asking the same
questions as contract law scholars. The use of willingness-to-pay research to test Hadley models is one example.240 A similar approach
might benefit other areas of contract law. For instance, there may be
immediate connections with other problems related to measuring expectation damages, such as reduced recovery for subjective loss241 or
the lost-volume seller problem.242 Economic work in these areas also
depends on buyer valuation estimates or seller cost estimates that
might be tested with marketing data. Similarly, marketing research

Center for Marketing and Technology at the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley, at http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/CMT/index.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2005); and the Kilts Center for Marketing at the University of Chicago, at
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/kilts/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
238. E.g., sources cited supra note 237.
239. Silk and Urban’s ASSESSOR application pioneered this type of research. See Silk &
Urban, supra note 145. Other technological models include the following: Robert Blattberg &
John Golanty, Tracker: An Early Test Market Forecasting and Diagnostic Model for New
Product Planning, 15 J. MARKETING RES. 192 (1978) (the TRACKER model); John R. Hauser
& Steven P. Gaskin, Application of the “Defender” Consumer Model, 3 MARKETING SCI. 327
(1984) (the Defender Consumer model); Lewis G. Pringle et al., NEWS: A Decision-Oriented
Model for New Product Analysis and Forecasting, 1 MARKETING SCI. 1 (1982) (the NEWS
model); and Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., LTM Estimating Procedures, in NEWPRODUCT FORECASTING 249 (Yoram Wind et al. eds., 1981) (the LTM model). ACNeilson
BASES, a group that tests and advises on markets, offers the BASES system for testing new
products and price points, inter alia, prior to broad market release. ACNeilson BASES, at
http://www.bases.com/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2004). ACNeilson advertises this system as “the
global leader in Simulated Test Marketing.” ACNEILSON BASES, SEE TOMORROW, TODAY
(Corporate Brochure), available at http://www.bases.com/images/pdf/BASES%20Brochure.pdf
(last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
240. See supra Part III.
241. A number of commentators suggest that the appropriate default rule again depends on value distributions of the contracting population. Imposing a market-value default rule, for example, might force parties with high subjective values to reveal this preference by contracting around the default. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 37; Muris, supra
note 233.
242. The issue here is whether a breached-against seller who resells the good for the
same price should receive any compensation for lost sales volume. Lawmakers may want to
choose a default rule that exposes a seller’s cost structure so buyers will take efficient precautions against breach. For instance, a penalty default rule awarding no lost-profit damages could force high-cost retailers to come forward and contract for a nonrefundable deposit or liquidated damages. The situation thus parallels Hadley, but now the distribution
of seller costs—or seller willingness-to-accept (WTA), to use the marketing term—is a key
variable. See Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1432 (1985); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Measuring Sellers’ Damages:
The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323 (1979); Victor P. Goldberg, An Economic
Analysis of the Lost-Volume Retail Seller, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 283 (1984).
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may inform issues of contract interpretation243 or contract formation.244 It is worth exploring explicit connections more carefully.
While the call for empirical contract law research is loud, the
work thus far is sparse.245 This may be explained by the significant
investments of time, money, and training needed to conduct empirical projects.246 Thus, importing data from another research discipline
might bring immediate benefits. The field of marketing may be a
ready-made source of data for testing and refining economic models
of contract law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The last three decades of contract law scholarship have increasingly relied on economic theory to support normative claims. But as
the models grow more complicated, commentators are beginning to
question whether economic analysis of contract law has failed. A new
wave of empirical research is needed to test and refine theoretical
claims, but it is unclear whether meaningful empirical projects are
even possible.
The famous rule of Hadley v. Baxendale illustrates this tension,
perhaps better than any other area of contract law. Hadley takes on
great significance in the literature as an archetype for contract default rules that improve an economic system by exposing asymmetric
information. But Hadley does not always work, and unfortunately it
is difficult to determine when it will. Key variables in the Hadley
models, such as the distribution of buyer valuations, are hard to
measure. And the impact of multiple effects needs to be summed. Ultimately, there are hard questions about the appropriate level of
granularity for the default rule: should it be applied to a single
buyer, a single product, a single market, or the entire legal system?
Drawing upon recent work in the field of marketing, this Article
has conducted an empirical assessment of the Hadley rule in three
simple markets. It finds that Hadley typically generates more social

243. For example, interpretation issues can raise similar doctrinal choices between majoritarian defaults that mimic popular desires and penalty defaults that force efficient disclosure of private information. See Posner, supra note 11, at 839-42. This approach may
also help private parties, as opposed to lawmakers, design efficient mechanisms for contract interpretation. In fact, private parties might be able to populate the models with
their own historical data, mitigating some of the challenges of gathering empirical information. Cf. Katz, supra note 124.
244. Economic models of the mutual mistake doctrine, for example, depend on variables for buyer valuation and seller costs. See Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 227, at 31415. There are likely to be other doctrinal applications related to contract formation.
245. Heise, supra note 18, at 816; Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1036; Landes, supra note
18, at 176.
246. Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 164-65; Heise, supra note 18, at 85-123;
Landes, supra note 18, at 178-79.
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welfare than a full-damages default rule, suggesting that markets
facing similar conditions might also benefit from the Hadley rule.
But these conclusions must be qualified. They do not hold when
high-value buyers are much more likely to incur consequential damages or face very high transaction costs. A full-damages default rule
is often better when low-value buyers take most of the benefits from
tailored precautions. And introducing seller market power might also
change the results. Thus, the work presents evidence in support of
Hadley, but it also raises the need for more research in this area.
Finally, this Article suggests that existing work in the field of
marketing may serve as a ready-made source of data for testing economic theories of contract law. Marketing enjoys a rich tradition of
empirical research, and the case for linking contract and marketing
scholarship appeals on an intuitive level. Both disciplines deal fundamentally with transactional exchange. The use of willingness-topay data to assess the Hadley rule is one example of the connection.
It is possible that broader use of marketing research can address
other perceived dead ends in contract law theory.

